Closure of the session

UN concludes final OEWG meeting on ICT security with focus on establishing a future dialogue mechanism

The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security Of, and in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) convened its final meeting to discuss the establishment of a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue (RID) on ICT security under the United Nations (UN) framework. The session, chaired by an unnamed Chair, aimed to build upon the consensus agreements and achievements of the OEWG, with the current mandate concluding post-2025.

The Chair encouraged delegates to focus on the function, action, and substance of the future mechanism, rather than its form, acronym, or semantics. The discussions centered around creating a permanent, state-led, and consensus-based mechanism that would be inclusive of all member states and continue the progress made by the OEWG. The need for the mechanism to be action-oriented, with a particular emphasis on capacity building, was underscored by multiple delegates.

A key proposal for the future mechanism was the Programme of Action (POA), supported by a cross-regional group of states and presented in detail by France. The POA was envisioned as a single-track, permanent, and action-oriented mechanism to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace and enhance global cybersecurity. It aimed to support the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior, enable discussions on further development of the framework, and ensure meaningful participation and cooperation with non-governmental stakeholders.

The Chair’s discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism was generally well-received, with several delegates providing specific feedback and suggestions for improvement. The paper was seen as a good starting point for further discussions, reflecting the consensus contained in the previous year’s annual report.

The proposal for a moratorium on First Committee resolutions until the end of the OEWG’s mandate was put forward by Brazil and supported by other delegates. This proposal sought to concentrate efforts within the OEWG framework and prevent competing initiatives that could undermine the mandate.

The Chair expressed optimism about the constructive discussions and the convergence of views among member states, noting that the common elements outnumbered the points of divergence. A virtual informal meeting was scheduled to continue the discussion on RID, with the intention of revising the discussion paper based on the inputs received.

The session coincided with International Women’s Day, and the Chair acknowledged the increasing participation and engagement of women in the OEWG discussions. The Chair thanked all participants for their contributions and looked forward to future engagements.

In conclusion, the meeting highlighted the commitment of member states to work collaboratively towards establishing a future mechanism that would ensure a secure and stable cyberspace. The positive energy and constructive nature of the week’s sessions were seen as indicative of the potential for achieving consensus on the future mechanism.

Chair:
Good afternoon, distinguished delegates. The tenth and final meeting of the seventh substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security Of, and in the use of ICTs established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 75-240, is now called to order. We’ll now begin the discussion on the section under regular institutional dialogue, and it’s my intention to give the floor first to the Delegation of France, which has requested the floor to make a presentation. And after that, I’ll open the floor for remarks and speakers who wish to speak on the topic. So, France, you have the floor, please.

France:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation would like to thank you for the opportunity to share with the OEWG this presentation, which followed many, many negotiations, is full of concrete proposals, and offers some food for thought regarding the future regular institutional dialogue mechanism, the RID. First and foremost, I’d like to thank you personally, as well as your team, for the excellent job you did compiling all of the information in the discussion paper on the elements of a future RID mechanism. I believe this document reflects the rich nature of our discussions at the sixth session, as well as the questions which you raised there, questions related to ways forward. In making this concrete presentation right now, we’d like to answer some of those questions, recalling agreed principles and the positions outlined by other states. For four years now, France, working together with a cross-regional group of states, has been considering how we could organize a future RID mechanism. The objective is very simple. We believe that we need to continue and also to beef up the very vital negotiations so as to spur responsible conduct on the part of all states. We also think that we need to add another dimension. It is incumbent upon us to endow the UN with the capacity to take concrete action to bolster the resilience and security of cyberspace, specifically, but not only, through capacity building. France shares our collective ambition, that is, to finalize the work on the future mechanism within the OEWG. We’ve been working very actively to this end. Against a geopolitical backdrop which is particularly testing, we’ve noted with pleasure the many points of convergence on this future mechanism which are emerging within the OEWG. We’d like to contribute to this very positive momentum, thereby avoiding and overcoming the risk of a parallel process being established. I believe it’s essential to reiterate the inclusive and incremental approach we’ve adopted when preparing this presentation. As you invited us to do in December, Mr. Chairman, and as we said at the last session, France has been working with an informal group of states from a whole host of regions. This is done to best reflect the substance of the future mechanism. Working in this format through frank dialogue, we hope we’ll be able to work together to strike a balance. To avoid a politicization of this last afternoon’s session, today we’ve opted not to submit a co-sponsored text because we believe that what’s at stake is the very substance of our proposal. For that reason, we are shouldering our responsibility and will be submitting to you a presentation in a national capacity. Nonetheless, I’d like to underscore speaking before you that what I’ll be presenting, it’s not France’s take of what the synthesis of our debates boils down to. Discussions will continue and I hope they’ll continue during the time you’ll be able to grant us at our next informal session. This presentation will also be available on the OEWG website. We believe that following the lead of your discussion paper, we’ll be able to pave the way towards a consensus-based future, incorporating all of the various constructive criticism and comments we received, particularly from states with different viewpoints, because this mechanism embodies the very multilateralism through action which is up to all states to enact. Briefly, and switch to English, as to stick to the precise language that resulted from cross-regional coordination. And as you know now a bit, the Frenchman, for a French person, this is already quite a first compromise. Chair, let me begin by explaining the title of our presentation. We have decided to title it Mechanism, and to be clear, we are still in favor of using the label Program of Action, as it refers to existing models within the UN, such as the POA on small arms and light weapons. And it also reflects clearly our collective objective of a permanent and action-oriented mechanism. However, it will be up to this group to come up with a name, and the presentation will focus on substance rather than branding. So in terms of general principles, this proposed mechanism would be state-led, action-oriented, permanent… and inclusive. Three of these elements have already been agreed upon in paragraph 55 of the second NPR. And we also heard the call of a majority of delegations to accelerate the move towards action. So in this visual representation, you can see arrows. Those arrows create a result-oriented platform. The mechanism is intended to function as a single-track cycle of continuous improvement, where implementation results in best practices and lessons learned that can, in turn, inform discussions, such as the one we have today, on the normative framework for responsible state behavior, including its further development if judged necessary. So the following components that are in the visual representation would function as a cohesive process supported by a permanent secretariat with dedicated human resources. So I will now present the main components of such a mechanism. So first, thank you. So the review conferences would be convened in the framework of the POA every few years. The scope of these review conferences would include assessing the evolving cyber threat landscape, the result of the initiatives and meetings of the mechanism. It would also include updating the framework as necessary and it would provide strategic direction and mandate or a program of work for the POA’s activities. Let me highlight our constructive approach here. Through this REFCON, the POA would also provide a venue to consider the need for additional voluntary non-binding norms or additional legally binding obligations as necessary. We do not want to prejudge the outcomes of the OEWG discussions on the detailed modalities. This is why we left the frequency of the meetings open and why we put periodically on the document. Many proposals were made in that regard during the last session, notably by China and by Egypt. And the periodicity would really need to be defined as not to be a burden to delegations, especially delegations from small countries and developing countries. And it also needs to keep up with the rapid evolution of technology and of the threat landscape. Next slide. Thank you. The POA would also include open-ended plenary discussions. So these open-ended discussions would be similar to the format of other UN forums, such as the current OEWG, which are familiar to many delegations. Such discussions would include all member states. And again, the periodicity of these plenary sessions would need to be determined and, if necessary, make use of inter-sessional meetings. As a matter of fact, to have all the voices in those plenary discussions, in addition to existing sponsorships, a program to facilitate the participation of all member states could be considered. Next. Thank you. The cyclical nature of the future mechanism will be rooted in the implementation of the framework. And this is really the most substantial part of the proposal. Reporting best practices, identifying challenges, and conducting practical initiatives will really contribute to informed, needs-based, and strategic decision-making by member states during the review conferences and during plenary discussions. So the first modality to really focus the work of the mechanism and the implementation of the framework would be open-ended technical or thematic discussions. So those discussions would intend to provide expertise by government and, when relevant, from other stakeholders, such as academia. Let’s be clear that the scope and preparatory work of these technical discussions would be limited to priority topics identified in plenary sessions. These meetings could take stock of the work and collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations to promote exchanges. We can also take stock of precedents in the UN system, such as, for instance, the open-ended meetings of governmental experts in the implementation of the Small Arms and Light Weapons POA of 2011 and 2015. There could also be a discussion to facilitate participation of all member states in those thematic discussions on focus topics about hybrid modalities for those technical meetings. But again, this is very much a proposal to be discussed with the OEWG. Next step. Thank you. The other modalities are here presented as four modalities that really feed the discussions on the implementation of the framework. So the first one is capacity building, which is really a cross-cutting modality. The POA could leverage existing and potential capacity building efforts in order to increase their visibility and improve their coordination, as well as to support the mobilization of resources. And this could also go through existing and new funding instruments, for example, on foundational capacities. The review conferences and the discussions would then provide an opportunity to exchange on the ongoing capacity building efforts and identify areas where additional action is needed. And those capacity building actions would be consistent with the principles set out in the paragraph 56 of the final report of the 2019-2021 OEWG, as well as based on the outcomes of the discussions in the current OEWG, as the previous session demonstrated the richness of those discussions. Another modality would be voluntary reporting by states. This voluntary reporting could be based either on creating a new reporting system or by promoting existing mechanisms, such as the UNIDIRS National Survey of Implementation or national reports to the UN Secretary General. Here the reporting would also facilitate dedicated capacity building activities and really exchanges on best practices. We’ve put the practical initiatives here as a modality to show the continuity between the different UN processes. So the POA would contain and enable and deepen practical initiatives. It would build on existing initiatives and develop new ones when necessary. So for instance, that could include initiatives that are already being implemented within the OEWG, such as the global POC directory that constitutes really a cornerstone in the long term. And also could be discussed new initiatives that are in discussion within the OEWG, such as a comprehensive online portal or a threat repository. And finally, we’ve put the contributions from the multi-stakeholder community. The POA would enable that engagement and collaboration with the multi-stakeholder community, including to allow for the best capacity building activities possible. This engagement would be based on the principle of voice, not a vote, as the multi-stakeholder community has a unique expertise and major responsibilities when it comes to promoting stability and security in cyberspace. Next slide. Thank you. As we’ve completed, I’d just like to say a few words by way of conclusion. At the outset, I’d like to underscore that in December we used a metaphor for an operating system to explain that this proposal should be seen as a platform that can also host new initiatives. So this is what we’ll return to this afternoon. Also I wanted to say once again that we are staunchly convinced that we must add to what we already have, what already works. What we need to add is this ability to host, to incorporate new elements. Otherwise we’ll have a digital gap on our hands. And this week, the sessions on threats and on capacity building convinced us further that it is absolutely vital to continue down that path. Next I wanted to add that we’ll be submitting at the next session, you’ll be convening, Mr. Chairman, a cross-regional paper to build on this proposal. And until then, France stands ready to listen to the contributions of all member states, especially those who would like to co-sponsor our proposal. Another objective is to deepen this within the framework of the OEWG in the spirit of consensus. This is something you mentioned on Monday morning, Mr. Chairman. We’ll be listening, therefore, very carefully to all of the statements delivered at this session. By way of conclusion, I just wanted to add that even if we haven’t set an example, Albin and I, we’re not really showing you an example. As we may, we wish everyone a very happy International Women’s Day.

Chair:
Thank you very much, France, for your presentation, both in French and English, and also for the schematic or visual representation of your proposal for the future mechanism. I think your presentation is very clear, and I regard that as being very helpful so that we can all here have a collective discussion, not only about this proposal, but also hear the views of everyone about how we should move forward with regard to a future mechanism, because the future mechanism is going to belong to all of us, and we need to shape that collectively. So thank you very much once again, France, for your presentation. The floor is now open. I give the floor now to Yemen, which is making a statement on behalf of the Arab Group, to be followed by the European Union. Yemen, please.

Yemen:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Arab Group would like to… We begin by expressing our appreciation for you, your team, and the Secretariat for your efforts during the works of the Open-Ended Working Group. We reaffirm our commitment to do our utmost in order to have this track succeed. Mr. Chairman, the Arab Group supports the track of the Open-Ended Working Group as a platform, a comprehensive one, to discuss all topics related to cybersecurity under the auspices of the United Nations, including the future mechanism for a regular institutional dialogue to be established after the mandate of our Open-Ended Working Group comes to an end post-2025 and after extensive discussions in this working group in order to respond to the concerns of all delegations. The Arab Group supports the efforts aiming at the implementations of the consensus outcomes related to rules, norms, and principles of the responsible behavior of countries in the use of ICT, and we support to keep developing this existing normative framework in parallel in order to achieve a new and legally binding norms to keep pace with the developments in this field. The Arab Group supports also the principles in the second APR concerning the future mechanism that should be one unified, comprehensive, and permanent and flexible track working under the auspices of the United Nations and making decisions consensus-based and to build upon the consensus results of our Open-Ended Working Group. In addition, the future mechanism should be ambitious and deal with all sides pertaining to the security of ICTs. In this regard, the Arab Group is of the view that the mandate of the future mechanism should include the following pillars. Number one, to support the capacity building of countries in a very regular and permanent manner through programs and specific projects in order to improve the capacities of developing countries in order to implement the norms that we will agree upon and we have agreed upon. Second, to define the gaps in the existing framework through the follow-up of implementation. And number three, to develop the existing framework, normative framework, in order to achieve new legally and reach new legally binding norms. And according to the recommendations of the second annual report, the Arab Group affirms the importance of holding deep, specific, and separate and independent discussions and sessions for discussions to discuss the elements of the future mechanism, including the scope, the mandate, the structure, the periodicity of meetings, and the modalities contributing to a consensus between all countries around the pillars of this future mechanism without repeating the general discussions since we are coming very close to our final, substantive annual session. In this regard, the Arab Group appreciates the efforts of the chair of the OEWG who had circulated a draft of elements of this future mechanism. We think that this is a good basis for negotiations and includes lots of positive elements. The draft proposes including a very clear reference to the decision-making mechanism in the future mechanism, in addition to reviewing some of the provisions when it comes to the periodicity of meetings. We would like to indicate the importance of the permanent nature of this suggested mechanism in contrast with the mandate of our group, which is time-limited, as well as the increase in the heaviness of the program of work of the United Nations Office for Disarmament that could impact negatively the capacity of developing countries to participate in case there are so many meetings. In conclusion, the Arab Group would like to reiterate the importance of participating very positively and very flexibly with the draft element proposed by the chair, and to avoid any efforts to disperse our efforts or discussions, including proposing other draft proposals in competition with the one of the chair. And we affirm the importance of having the political will, the required political will, to avoid creating parallel tracks that would have very negative repercussions on the discussion in the United Nations when it comes to disarmament, and increase the divisions between countries and also would affect the efficient participation of all delegations, especially those of medium and small size in discussion, taking into account what the works of the first commission witnessed during the 78th session of the General Assembly under other items. In conclusion, we reiterate our firm commitment to continue participating very positively in this track, and we are ready to exchange with all parties in order to achieve and reach consensus and support the work of our open-ended group until the mandate comes to an end. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Yemen. On behalf of the Arab Group, European Union, please.

European Union:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. The candidate countries, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA countries, Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, aligned themselves with this statement. The sixth substantive session of the open-ended working group in December showed that discussions are focusing on the future mechanism in a constructive way. The EU and the member states are dedicated to fostering convergence within the open-ended working group. In this regard, we would like to commend the Chair for bringing to the table a discussion paper on proposed common elements for the future mechanism, to complement the list agreed upon in the second annual progress report. Mr. Chair, please let me highlight that the substantive discussions on new common elements can take stock of the concrete proposal of the program of action as a permanent mechanism to enable the achievement of responsible state behavior in the use of ICT technologies in the context of international security. This inclusive initiative has been supported since 2020 by a cross-regional group of states and regional organizations, including the EU. It has enjoyed a broad support because it seeks to achieve institutional stability with the establishment of a permanent, results-based, action-orientated, inclusive and transparent mechanism that builds on our collective work in the past UNGGs and open-ended working groups. This will allow focused efforts on supporting states in promoting the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior and of needs-driven capacity building to increase cyber resilience globally. Mr. Chair, this preparatory work on the content of the future mechanism leads the EU to make the following comments to the proposed new common elements. First, in terms of functions of the mechanism, we welcome the intention to include focus on further developing the framework. We indeed believe a future mechanism would enable discussions to develop additional common understandings on the substantive elements of the involving framework for responsible state behavior, including international law, norms, CBMs and capacity building. In addition, to strengthen the capacity of all states, this common element could be mentioned in capacity building as the main means towards enhanced state capacities in the implementation of the framework. The development of the framework stems from the lessons learned and gaps identified in implementing it. We would also suggest adding a fourth function, the fostering of inclusive dialogue. Indeed, broad participation is crucial to enhance security and stability in cyberspace. Therefore, it is paramount to ensure inclusive dialogue and cooperation by including all relevant stakeholders. State actors possess unique expertise essential for effectively addressing cyber threats and their efforts on citizens as well as states and carry great responsibility for ensuring stability and security in cyberspace. On the scope, the Open Native Working Group could consider adding the future mechanism will continue practical initiatives implemented by previous UN processes, including the ones initiated by 2021 to 2025 Open Native Working Group, such as the global BSC directory. This means that the future mechanism will build on the initiatives agreed upon in the current Open Native Working Group and continue discussions on other practical initiatives, such as the global BSC directory. On the structure, taking stock of other UN mechanisms, a reference to a review conference could be added. It could read, the future mechanism will convene periodic review conferences to review the framework for responsible state behavior, to update the framework as necessary, and to provide strategic direction for the mechanism’s work. This would also allow to streamline common elements by providing a clear modality for reviewing the framework for responsible state behavior. Finally, on decision making. Mr. Chair, we must continue to make progress. The European Union is determined to root the practical initiatives initiated during this Open Native Working Group cycle in a single track, action-orientated and results-based permanent mechanism to achieve long-term impact. Additionally, the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building will advance the international community’s work on capacity building in concrete and coherent ways, as to provide deliverables for fostering cyber resilience in the long term. In other words, the BOA as a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue does not in any way represent a departure from or contradict the current Open Native Working Group format, nor does continuing working on defining the BOA detract from developing other practical initiatives in the current Open Native Working Group. Mr. Chair, we look forward to continue our work in establishing a permanent and actionable platform to benefit states in the implementation on the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you. Thank you very much, European Union, for your statement.

Russian Federation:
Mr. Chairman, determining the parameters of a mechanism which will succeed the OEWG after 2025 is our key objective for the remaining 18 months of the group’s activities. What’s of principal importance is resolving this issue strictly on the basis of consensus with due regard for the views of all states. We need to do this within the confines of the existing OEWG, not outside them. It is this kind of agreement that has been set forth in the second APR, which we adopted by consensus. We categorically do not accept the attempts of a number of states to push through decisions which serve their interests to do this through a simple majority at the GA. This kind of approach will not be met with understanding on the part of member states, first and foremost developing countries. These countries have spent a great deal of time fighting to get the opportunity to directly partake in the negotiations process on the principles governing information security. Especially given that on the OEWG’s agenda we have a whole host of constructive ideas and proposals, we take as our starting point that the future platform should create equal conditions for all states. It should not be tailored to serve the interests of specific states to the detriment of the interests of others. In that sense, the format of the OEWG has in practice shown itself to be both valid and effective. In the short amount of time that has elapsed since 2018, this format has managed to win the trust and support of the overwhelming majority of states in the UN. We believe it is worthwhile to preserve this common achievement by establishing, after 2025, a permanent OEWG which would have a decision-making function. Let me remind you that at the previous OEWG session back in December 2023, a group of 13 states, that is Belarus, Burundi, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, the DPRK, Cuba, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Syria, Sudan and Eritrea, put forward a concept paper. You can read that concept paper, finding it on the OEWG website. Let me highlight just a few of its most important points. First of all, we need to ensure continuity between the new body and the groups which preceded it. What this means is ensuring that we adopt the principle of consensus when making decisions. It goes without saying, states are coming up against difficulties. They do come up against difficulties when coming to universal agreements that satisfy the interests of all states. And yet, practice shows that it is possible to come to such agreements. It is in fact the best way to ensure that the most balanced and result-oriented decisions are achieved. This is evidenced by what was achieved in July 2023, an agreement to establish a global intergovernmental registry of points of contact. The mandate of a permanent OEWG should be geared towards future supporting the establishment of an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT sphere through the practical implementation of agreements achieved within the group. A priority pillar of activity for the future mechanism, in our view, is the crafting of legally binding rules, norms and principles for the responsible behavior of states, which would serve as the elements for a future universal agreement on international information security. What’s also in the spotlight is adapting international law with due regard for the idiosyncrasies of ICTs, launching mechanisms for practical cooperation between states and strengthening CBMs. Also in the spotlight is the establishment of specific programs or funds to assist with information security capacity building. The implementation of all of the aforementioned measures as a whole will ultimately help us to build an effective mechanism for preventing and peacefully settling intergovernmental conflicts in the global information sphere. Our idea to set up a permanent OEWG can easily subsume other state initiatives. For example, India’s proposal to set up a global web portal. As for the discussion paper prepared by the chair, that’s the discussion paper on a permanent mechanism on ICT security. We regret that this paper was circulated just before the session began. The document is currently under interagency cooperation, and yet even at first glance we’ve noticed that there’s no clear description of the mandate for this future body, nor is a key element, in our view, covered, that is the development of legally binding agreements. Nor is it clear why the paper mentions just one of the national initiatives on the regular institutional dialogue that were officially submitted. On our side, we stand ready to partake in constructive work on the draft so as to establish a negotiating format on international information security which serves the interests of all states on the understanding that the principled components of our approach will be taken on board. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Russian Federation, for your statement. I give the floor now to Sri Lanka, to be followed by Egypt.

Sri Lanka:
Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Sri Lanka welcomes your discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security, which forms a good basis for our discussions and wishes to present concisely our preliminary reactions. We are mindful of the fact that a regular institutional dialogue can be useful in the use of information communication technology, and our delegation believes that it will encourage knowledge sharing, collaboration, policy development, capacity building, and stakeholder engagement. Sri Lanka also affirms that the future permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN should be a single track and state-led mechanism reporting to the first committee, with the objective of promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. It’s also important that the establishment and the decision-making process of the mechanism be on consensus basis. The decisions could be adapted during substantive sessions and to be formalized by the UNGA through the first committee. Having given careful consideration to the proposed modalities, Chair, Sri Lanka supports the proposal that the permanent mechanism be established as a subsidiary body of the first committee and the UNODA to serve as its permanent secretariat. Mr. Chair, my delegation wishes to note that it would be more effective if the sequence of submitting of progress reports, be it annual or biennial, corresponds with the term of the Chair and its Bureau, appointed or elected, having regard to the principle of geographical representation. To ensure its inclusive nature, Sri Lanka is of the view that its formal meetings as well as inter-sessional meetings could be held at the UN headquarters in New York. It’s suggested that an e-portal be established or a dedicated platform could be incorporated to the current e-delegate website to facilitate its work. It’s further suggested that the group could explore the possibility of adding the POC to this dedicated portal so that information can be accessed through a centralized portal. Sri Lanka looks forward to constructively engaging in our deliberations on this item of discussion.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Sri Lanka, for your statement. I think you made the point about aligning the frequency of progress reports with the frequency of the rotation of the Chair, which is a point that I also draw the attention of everyone to reflect about. So if we choose to make the Chair’s tenure for a period of X number of years, then the frequency of reporting would also be for X amount of years. I think that’s a fair point for consideration by all delegations. Thank you, Sri Lanka. Egypt to be followed by Cuba.

Egypt:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First aligns itself with the statement of the Arab group delivered by the distinguished delegate of Yemen, and let me add the following remarks in our national capacity. In the outset, let me express our appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for sharing the draft elements paper on the future regular institutional dialogue, RID, which we believe is a good basis for further negotiations. And while this paper is still under consideration, let me share with you our preliminary observations in this context that would focus on the scope, mandate, and meetings periodicity. Mr. Chairman, with regards to the scope and mandate, while we can positively consider the proposed three pillars reflected in Section 7A entitled functions, we believe that these should serve as the scope and mandate of the future mechanism. And let me explain how these pillars could complement each other and represent a comprehensive mandate and scope for a future single track mechanism in this domain. For the first pillar, it would be advancing the implementation of the existing agreed framework of responsible state behavior and the consensual related outcomes including this OEWG. The future mechanism, FM, should increase the level of commitment of member states to the agreed normative framework through the periodic voluntary reporting by member states of this framework. And templates should be flexible and agreed by member states in a later stage. This will take us to the next pillar, which is developing the existing framework. The future mechanism should identify the gaps and challenges of the existing framework through the periodic assessment and review of a state’s voluntary implementation reports as well as promote actionable recommendations to respond to these gaps. In addition to that, the future mechanism should ensure the continuity of discussions on the outstanding matters including international law through the establishment of subsidiary informal working or experts groups upon the agreement of member states. The aforementioned two pillars cannot be achieved without the third and most important one, which is the third one, which is promoting capacity building. In addition to its centrality and cross-cutting nature of the ICT agenda, capacity building should become the cornerstone of the future mechanism as an enabler for the effective implementation of the agreed framework through the provision of concrete and sustained support for states based on their needs and assessments, while the establishment of a trust fund to support these efforts is crucial. In this vein, with such a comprehensive mandate, there is no need for establishing multiple or parallel processes in this domain under the UN auspices. Moreover, we believe that the future mechanism should ensure the operationalization and review as appropriate of the established cyber tools, including POC’s directory and all other proposals to be adopted by this OEWG. With regards to the meeting periodicity on the future mechanism, we share the viewpoint that it should convene the following first, biannual meetings every two years, second, review conferences to be convened every six years, third, intersessional meetings or informal working groups that may be decided by consensus, that member states might decide by consensus to hold intersessional meetings or to establish informal working groups to focus on specific issues as mentioned before, including international law. In this context, we stress the importance to differentiate between time-limited mandate processes that might convene two or more sessions a year plus intersessional meetings and a permanent mechanism, which we are discussing here, that should take into account the exponentially increasing disarmament agenda in the United Nations, avoiding any overlaps with disarmament meetings, as well as the difficulties that developing states have to effectively participate in those processes with such condensed meetings as scheduled, bearing in mind the capacity limitations of those group of states, which is developing states that we belong to. Before we conclude, we hope that the aforementioned elements would be reflected in the updated version of the Chairs element paper, and we look forward to convening focused discussions on all elements related to the future mechanism, bearing in mind that we are getting closer to the final annual cycle of this OEWG, hence specific agenda items require special attention at this stage, and here we are referring to the RID. To achieve consensus and to avoid any duplication of processes that would lead to further division and polarization among member states. And also let me take note with appreciation of the presentation by the French delegation today, which include positive elements that align with our national position in this context. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we reiterate our support and commitment to this process towards the conclusion of its mandate, and we encourage all delegations to substantively engage on all aspects of the future mechanism, while the title of the future mechanism should be decided by the wider membership. And I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Egypt, for your statement. We have about 35 speakers, and of course we would need to wrap up at 6 o’clock, so mathematically it works out to around three minutes per delegation. I would hate to impose time limits on any delegation by cutting off the microphone, and it’s not my intention to do so. But I would encourage you to, if you can, highlight the key points you wish to make, circulate your statements to me directly and to the Secretariat, so we put it on the website, and highlight the key points of divergence based on what you have heard so far, and highlight the key points of convergence, so that I have a sense of what are we converging around and whether there are any points of divergence. That will give me guidance as I reflect on the next iteration of the Chair’s discussion paper. So with those comments, Cuba to be followed by Brazil.

Cuba:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is vital to preserve multilateralism and the stewardship and auspices of the United Nations Organization in addressing matters related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. In principle, we have viewed positively your draft elements for the future permanent mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security. In this regard, our delegation reaffirms the following. Number one, the need to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the future mechanism and consensus as methods to follow in decision-making. Number two, the future mechanism must continue the issues that have been the center of our debate in the OEWG, including those which, because of their complexity, will need to be discussed further to reach the necessary consensus, such as the need to prepare new norms and determining which ones should be binding, as well as the matter of how to apply international law in the context of cyberspace. Number three, we do not support creating parallel mechanisms or mechanisms which duplicate or take the place of the OEWG. Rather, we support this group’s results. This mechanism, this body, has shown its effectiveness and recognition. Mr. Chairman, we believe that following a rigorous, in-depth, and objective analysis, we can come to the next session with a proposed mechanism to continue the work of the OEWG. This would make it possibly sufficiently in advance to ensure the continuity of our work in order to develop cooperation among states on the basis of identifying and evaluating threats, setting forth strategies that favor confidence and capacity building, with, as we have stated before, priority given to developing countries. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Cuba, for your statement and for being very succinct. Brazil, to be followed by United States.

Brazil:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. The discussions on regular institutional dialogue may be the most pivotal among the very relevant issues that comprise this OEWG’s agenda. A permanent and inclusive mechanism within the UN that meets regularly to debate cybersecurity is necessary to combat and prevent threats to peace and security stemming from digital technologies, thus allowing countries to fully reap their benefits. My delegation reiterates its appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, and your team for your efforts to help us make progress on this issue. We welcome, in particular, your paper with draft elements of a future mechanism, as we very much agree with your approach that our discussions should focus on the concrete constituting elements of this mechanism instead of on its name. We also take note of France’s presentation and will carefully consider its elements. It is our view that if we focus our discussions on the actual substance of what we would like this framework to be, we will find that there is a considerable amount of common ground. The consensual elements reflected in the second APR are far from insignificant, that it must be single-track, state-led, consensus-based, permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN, reporting to the first committee, and an open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, and flexible process to allow it to adapt its work to new technological developments, building upon the work of the DGEs and OEWGs as its foundation and with room for contribution from other stakeholders. This is a strong foundation for the work ahead. As previously stated, a regular institutional dialogue mechanism must integrate all key aspects to a secure ICT environment, such as confidence building and capacity building, and also allow for in-depth discussions on areas where common understanding still eludes. In this regard, we view with interest your proposal on the establishment of thematic groups to have focused discussions on specific issues. There must be due consideration, however, to balance the need for further discussions with the already very full schedule of meetings at the UN in order to ensure that all delegations, including smaller ones, can meaningfully engage in those debates. With regards to its decision-making process, it will be important to find a way to ensure that the cardinal principle of consensus is not misused in order to avoid the stagnation we continue to witness when so many bodies are dedicated to security issues. Besides its substantive elements, however, your proposal is meritorious due to the simple fact that it advances the discussions on regular institutional dialogue within this group where they must remain, as this is the body with the GA’s mandate to discuss and establish such a framework. Our consensus decision-making process will ensure broad support to what we eventually adopt. The use of the singular here is key. It needs to be a single track. The complex challenges to peace and security posed by the malicious use of ICTs need a unified response from the international community. Furthermore, fragmentation would disproportionately overburden smaller delegations, particularly from the developing world, at the risk of discussions lacking the diverse and representative number of views needed for their effectiveness. Brazil reiterates, as expressed in previous occasions on statements in a national capacity and as members of the IPSA Dialogue, its support for the OEWG process and its commitment to maintaining a single track process that all UN member states can contribute to. U.S. all delegations to refrain from bypassing the OEWG through the tabling of competing proposals on this issue outside of this process, which duplicate efforts and undermine the mandate, setting a concerning precedent for future UN-inclusive forums. In this regard, we reiterate the proposal made last October to have a moratorium on First Committee resolutions until the end of the OEWG’s mandate, to allow us to concentrate our efforts in fighting common ground here in this room. We must uphold our collective responsibility to the promotion of multilateralism and to addressing threats to international peace and security stemming from malicious use of ICTs. Brazil remains committed to its continued work to the OEWG and to you, Mr. Chair, in this endeavor. I thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Brazil, for your statement and also take note of your proposal for a moratorium on competing resolutions outside the framework of the OEWG. I also very much like to hear reactions and comments on that very specific idea put forward by Brazil. United States, to be followed by Latvia.

United States:
Thank you, Chair. The OEWG has a clear mandate to continue its work on common elements for R&D and deepen discussions with a focus on the Future Permanent Mechanism, the program of action that 161 states voted to establish last year in Resolution 78-16. That resolution recognized the role of the OEWG in elaborating the scope, structure, content, and modalities of the future POA. At this point, we see productive OEWG discussion of future R&D as increasingly critical to ensuring a seamless transition to a permanent mechanism when this OEWG concludes in 2025. Over recent months, we have seen remarkable alignment and increasing convergence among states on the many elements of future regular institutional dialogue, including those discussed in the 2023 APR. In addition, we welcome the efforts by France to provide us with a diagram on the potential structure and key attributes of the future POA, which we view as very well aligned with your paper, Chair. In December’s session, we heard broad agreement on the need for the POA to be single-track, inclusive, flexible, action-oriented, and permanent. We cannot lose time negotiating modalities every few years. At the same time, the format for this permanent dialogue needs to be flexible and able to adapt to address states’ needs and new and emerging ICT challenges. And perhaps most importantly, it must be action-oriented. The future mechanism must be designed to facilitate the implementation of the UN Cyber Framework to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. With regard to the POA’s structure and in line with France’s proposal, we envision the POA as containing three primary components. First, periodic review conferences to review the strategic direction of the POA, evolve the framework as necessary, and consider resource needs and other strategic questions of the group. Second, general plenary meetings occurring every year or two. And third, technical meetings or working groups focusing on specific priority challenges, meeting a few times a year. The action orientation of the POA is its essence, not an optional feature. All interested states should be invited to work together in these focus groups to develop concrete recommendations that support implementation of the framework for the consideration of the plenary and ultimately the General Assembly. These working groups should be cross-regional in composition and should take a cross-cutting approach to implementing the framework, developing recommendations, assessments, and best practices on issues such as defending critical infrastructure, facilitating cooperation between states following a serious cyber incident, ways to improve accountability for irresponsible state behavior in cyberspace, sharing information on the evolving cyber threat landscape, and improving states’ ability to deter and disrupt ICT threats. A dedicated working group could also be stood up to consider how the POA Secretariat should implement and maintain an information sharing action-oriented platform that takes forward the Indian, Kenyan, and Filipino proposals, as well as how to integrate those with existing UN and non-UN platforms. Issue-based discussions would facilitate cross-cutting, substantive discussion on implementing the framework that breaks out of the traditional silos of threats, norms, international law, CBMs, and capacity building. As we have heard from states this week, the pillars of the framework are not hermetically sealed. Rather, these topics bleed into each other and need to be considered holistically. States agree that capacity building in particular cuts across all topics. Prioritizing the conversation about capacity building needs within the implementation working groups will lead to realistic and feasible recommendations and will speed implementation. We have also repeatedly heard this week about the relevance of non-state stakeholders in implementing the framework. While the POA must be state-led and consensus-driven, it must also incorporate the meaningful participation of other interested stakeholders, including the private sector, NGOs, and academia. Issue-focused technical meetings and working groups are an ideal vehicle for actively soliciting stakeholder consultation and interaction in line with the policy of a voice, not a vote. We continue to be disappointed by the actions of some states to deliberately exclude stakeholders, some of whom are international experts in law, incident response, capacity building, and CSERC cooperation. This is counterproductive and harmful to those states that are most in need of capacity building. To be helpful, stakeholders need to have both an understanding of the framework and its purpose, as well as the opportunity to share how they can be of assistance. Stakeholder modalities for the POA should, at a minimum, follow the gold standard model seen in other UN processes, where states are provided an opportunity to object to the participation of an organization and where a vote is required so all member states can have a say in determining whether a stakeholder should be excluded. Chair, as articulated in Resolution 7816, the OEWG has a key role in establishing the POA. From our perspective, the best and most inclusive way to stand up the POA will be for the OEWG to deliver a final report that paves a seamless path for its launch. To achieve that objective, we must begin now. In this year’s APR, we can build on the common elements included in last year’s APR by framing the structure and modalities of the POA and deciding on steps required for its launch. We appreciate your discussion paper in this regard. This group has many decisions to make over the next 18 months. The United States is ready to engage in this forum towards ensuring a seamless transition to a single, permanent, inclusive, flexible, and action-oriented institutional dialogue at the conclusion of this OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, United States. Latvia to be followed by Kenya.

Latvia:
Mr. Chair, we fully align with the EU statement. Following remarks are in our national capacity. We support the incremental approach to drafting a list of common elements for the future permanent mechanism. Thus, we have carefully evaluated the Chair’s discussion paper on draft elements and we would like to make following comments. In the section on functions, we would prefer putting the main emphasis on the implementation of the framework for the responsible state behavior in cyberspace rather than further development of it. As we have discussed before, significant efforts have been made to develop this framework and it is time to shift focus to the implementation of it. For example, Chair’s proposed draft of norms checklist would serve as a useful tool to enhance our common understandings on the implementation of the 11 voluntary and non-binding norms. Further advancement of the framework should be based on the assessment of implementation and on discussions among states and other stakeholders, benefiting from their in-depth knowledge and expertise. The future permanent mechanism should support needs-based capacity building activities to assist in the implementation of the framework and in strengthening states’ cyber resilience. In our perspective, the scope of the future permanent mechanism should allow to address all topics relevant to the advancement of the cyber security, including on the emerging threats and challenges. The mechanism should build on the cumulative work of the previous GGEs and OVGs, including on practical initiatives already agreed upon, for example, further operationalization of the global points of contact directory. When it comes to structure, we support establishment of dedicated thematic groups on relevant topics, among other things, on the application of international law in cyberspace, in particular of the UN Charter, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. These groups should be open to all states wishing to participate and meetings should be organized online and offline to ensure participation of smaller states. Considering the growing relevance of cyber security in the international security debate, it is the time to decide on the establishment of a permanent UN mechanism. A permanent platform would be an uninterrupted and continuous manner and hence common understandings and cooperation among states and the stakeholders to ensure more secure and stable cyberspace. Although we are still discussing the future permanent mechanism, we would like to emphasize that the proposal to establishment the program of action has received a wide support from all regional groups and support is still growing. Moreover, this initiative has been developed in incremental and transparent way within the OVG. Based on these considerations, Latvia supports France’s proposal for structure of POA presented today and it should be discussed further within the OVG. Mr. Chair, Latvia is fully committed to constructive discussions leading to additional common elements for the future UN permanent action-oriented mechanism to be included in the third annual progress report. Lastly, sincere congratulations and wishes to everyone in International Women’s Day and we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Chair for his dedication and time steering the ship with small and not so small states on the board towards the shore of consensus and development. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much Latvia. Thank you also for your maritime metaphor. I think the vessel has grown from a birch canoe to a bigger vessel, but whether the vessel is big or small, the waves are still choppy and we need to navigate carefully. Thank you very much. Kenya to be followed by El Salvador.

Kenya:
Thank you Chair. My delegation believes that future institutional dialogue should as OEWG be designed in line with the principles of equitable, inclusive and effective participation of all states. Kenya therefore submits the following five points. First is that the design of future institutional dialogue must ensure comprehensive representation and active participation of all member states. It should also consider the existing digital divide between members states which influences member states’ ability to implement the framework for responsible state behavior. This can be accomplished by devolving ICT security discussions to the regional level. This approach will underscore the commitment to inclusivity and regional collaboration, thereby enhancing the effectiveness and relevance of the dialogue. This has been done effectively in other disarmament and international security processes and can be applied on ICT security. Second, the future institutional dialogue should continue to discuss existing and potential threats and focus on capacity building aimed at building member states’ ability to implement the framework for responsible state behavior. Third is that the establishment of a mechanism for the exchange of information on best practices on implementation of framework for responsible state behavior can also be considered under the permanent mechanism building on the proposals already discussed at the OEWG. Fourth, future institutional dialogue should foster unity of purpose by ensuring that the collective efforts and energies of members remain undivided by avoiding competing concurrent processes. It is imperative to maintain a cohesive approach preventing fragmentation that may dilute the overall effectiveness of the process. Fifth, we need more details on how the thematic groups will work on specific issues. The planning of these details should be careful considering members’ ability to join and follow proposals systematically. It is important to create ways for members to participate, effectively encouraging meaningful contributions and informed decision-making within the thematic groups. I affirm Kenya’s continued constructive engagement to contribute to an enhanced global efforts, legal frameworks and norms that will promote a peaceful and stable cyber domain and at the same time cooperatively work to mitigate the existing and potential threats. I thank you, Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Kenya, El Salvador to be followed by Switzerland.

El Salvador:
Thank you, Chair. Given our time available, we will summarize our statement and it’ll be available in full on the web page of the working group. I will begin by thanking you for the submission of the document and we would very briefly like to say with regard to the structure proposed, we agree with your proposal of a two substantive annual sessions, the submission of voluntary biannual reports and the possibility of establishing thematic groups on relevant themes when they’re established or in the future. On the proposed modalities, we think that the ODA should be the secretariat since that guarantees the continuity of the mechanism. We support the presidency of two years with a bureau and we agree that the mechanism should be established at United Nations headquarters in New York where the process has taken place in the working group. With regard to the decision making process, we support the proposal to work by consensus, not to establish a veto mechanism for each member state but to ensure that decisions reflect the diversity of the United Nations membership. With regard to the review process, we believe that it should operate over a four-year period with the possibility of reviewing these agreements if the states so decide. And lastly, we support Brazil on a moratorium of resolutions in the first committee which we will review in detail with our capital. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, El Salvador. Thank you also for your comment with regard to your support for your two-year chairmanship of presidency. I’d also like to hear reactions from others on this specific point. But in general, I like the fact that delegations are giving their comments on very specific proposals on the discussion paper. So, the more specific you are in your reactions and suggestions, the better. Thank you. support, I’d also like to hear reactions. So, for example, is there anyone here who objects to a two-year rotating chairmanship? In other words, is there anyone here who believes strongly it should be rotating every year, for example? So, if there is, I’d like to hear it. Because this is, this is how we, we draw out the common elements or points of convergence and divergence, so that’s the idea of the discussion as well. So, don’t be shy to jump in and comment on what someone else has said. This is a first step in a discussion that will take many more rounds of discussion as we find the common elements and take another step forward. So, Switzerland to be followed by Malaysia.

Switzerland:
Thank you, Chair. In the interest of time, I will read the shorter version of our statement. Thank you for your guiding questions and the discussion paper. With regard to the possible functions of the permanent mechanism, as enumerated in point seven of your discussion paper, Switzerland would like to propose change in the order in which the functions are presented. The future permanent mechanism should focus on implementation of the existing framework for responsible behavioral states in cyberspace, as well as strengthen states capacities in this regard. Strong implementation efforts will, over time, allow to identify objectively possible gaps in the framework that would need to be addressed through the permanent mechanism, including by further developing the framework. In our view, further development of the framework without a clear vision on what further elements or adjustments in the framework are objectively needed, would risk wasting time and human resources for unfocused discussions. There needs to be a shared understanding of what further developments are needed. In order to allow for sufficient time to operationalize discussion points and possible decisions, we believe that one or two formal meetings should be held each year. In this annual meetings, state would be invited to conduct, on a voluntary basis, an assessment of their progress and challenges in implementing the framework. This could be done either by creating its own reporting system or by promoting existing mechanisms. Based on these assessments, the specific needs, positive lessons learned, challenges and priority areas could be identified. At the annual formal meetings, member states would adopt decisions and recommendations by consensus. Also, at the annual formal meetings and based on those discussions, member states could establish technical working groups by consensus. Regular exchanges with regional organizations, as well as relevant international bodies, should also be envisaged to share best practices and to support coordination with relevant international and regional initiatives. Where such exchanges already exist, the mechanism should build on corresponding experiences and structures as appropriate. During the intersessional period, technical working group meetings could be held, as established at the annual formal meetings. The findings and recommendations of those meetings would feed back into the annual formal meeting. The technical working groups would focus on priority areas, as identified at the annual meetings. These technical areas could include operationalization of specific voluntary norms through development of concrete guidance and exchange of best practices, advancing discussion and

Chair:
common understanding on how international law applies to cyberspace, presentation of concrete capacity building needs and provision of concrete support. The permanent mechanism could be subject to review on a regular basis. To this end, a conference could be held every fourth, fifth or sixth year. In our review, appointing a chair for only one year would not correspond to the permanent nature of the mechanism. We would therefore prefer to have a period of at least two years. With a view to the strong operational and action-oriented focus of the permanent mechanism, we believe that formal, as well as informal, intersessional meetings of the mechanisms could be held both in New York and Geneva. The future permanent mechanism should allow broad and meaningful participation by multi-stakeholders without them being hindered by the vetoes of a few countries. Modalities for the proceeding of meetings and working groups should therefore allow stakeholders to attend formal and informal sessions, deliver statements and provide oral and or written inputs for consideration member states. Finally, we would like to thank the French delegation for the presentation on behalf of a cross-regional group. It reflects, to a very large extent, our own ideas on the permanent mechanism, which is why we can support it. In our opinion, such a mechanism, for the time being called the program of

Switzerland:
action, is best suited as a permanent mechanism. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you, Switzerland. Pleasure to be followed by Cote d’Ivoire.

Malaysia:
Mr. Chair, as a developing country, Malaysia has been able to participate effectively in this OEWG, a universal forum for dialogue and debate on challenges in the ICT domain and formulation of solutions thereto. My delegation is concerned by the prospect of fragmentation of multilateral dialogue on ICT security, which could exacerbate the prevailing trust deficit, potentially unraveling hard-won consensus on the cumulative normative framework and producing divergent paths in its ongoing evolution. Additionally, there would be complications and constraints on a practical level. As we work to realize a single-track state-led permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN, in line with the second annual progress report, we thank the Chair for preparing a discussion paper to facilitate focused exchanges. Allow me to share Malaysia’s preliminary views pending further consideration by our capital. With regard to the functions of the permanent mechanism, Malaysia welcomes the elements in the Chair’s paper on advancing the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior, as well as further developing the framework and strengthening the capacities of states. As to scope, Malaysia believes that the topics under the future mechanism should be broadly similar to those of the OEWG, but with a higher level of specificity and detail. By way of example, there could be focused discussions on existing and potential threats recognized by states, such as ransomware, and measures to effectively tackle them through collaboration with key stakeholders. This would then lay the groundwork for concerted global action to disrupt the infrastructure of the threat actors in line with Norm 13d. In terms of the structure of the permanent mechanism, it is important to balance, on the one hand, the need for substantive deliberations and action, and on the other, the imperative of inclusiveness. We should ensure that the planning and conduct of meetings, both formal and intersessional, do not overwhelm the capacities of developing states in particular. On decision-making, Malaysia believes consensus is the best way forward. We also hope to benefit from the continued contributions of stakeholders, including cybersecurity industry and practitioners, whose expertise and views are integral in supporting states’ efforts in the ICT security domain. We welcome further discussions on the way forward within the OEWG, and thank the French delegation for its presentation, which we will study together with other proposals which have been put forward. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Malaysia. Côte d’Ivoire, to be followed by Croatia.

Cote d’Ivoire:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Côte d’Ivoire has shown its support for the program of action to promote responsible state behavior in terms of ICTs in the context of international security, especially through its support for successive relevant resolutions. The purpose of this support, which we think we should restate at this time, is, at the present stage of our work, has to do with its structure, principles, content, and the essential elements which we have agreed to by consensus. The first step is to establish a regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations. This is to contribute to strengthening its action to maintain international peace and security by the United Nations, and to prevent conflict in cyberspace. The program of action also includes an open and inclusive mechanism, and it includes modalities of participation to the benefit of the diversity of the skills of all states. And this is clearly stipulated in Resolutions 77, 37, and 78-16. The complementarity and continuity of the current working group is the guiding principle of the future mechanism. This, at the institutional level and the achievements of the OEWG, must continue, and my delegation therefore favors immediately establishing such a group. This would allow to avoid any break or produce delays. Furthermore, the program of action seeks to be permanent, flexible, and continuous in its development, so that we can face future developments in the digital landscape. The program of action responds to our will to establish an action-oriented mechanism and result-based, especially with regard to capacity building, which is an essential means to take into account the needs of states in developing their digital skills. Mr. Chairman, my delegation takes note of the various options and proposals which have been made on institutional dialogue. We must avoid duplication and establish institutions. institutional guidance. It is in the interest of the international community, and it is our responsibility to safeguard the unity, our unity in mobilizing our response to challenges in the digital landscape. Furthermore, the institution of parallel initiatives would be onerous financially for member states of the United Nations, and it would also create increased workloads for all states, which would be difficult for small delegations such as ours. The matter of the availability of time to consider all the options could be considered within the possibilities of this group, leading to establishing a permanent mechanism. And for all of the reasons above, Cote d’Ivoire supports the establishment of a single mechanism to succeed the current working group, and it believes that the program of action is a fully relevant alternative. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, to be followed by South Africa.

Croatia:
Thank you, Chair. Croatia aligns itself with the intervention of the European Union, and in national capacity would like to briefly address the topic of regular institutional dialogue. As someone who is following this working group since its beginning in 2019, I can confirm that we all together have reached a significant progress in cooperation in the field of ICT and with the point-of-contact directory, and hopefully with additional deliverables till 2025, we jointly have raised the level of trust and confidence-building among states. Therefore, we need to continue to exchange and work together towards preserving free, open, stable, and secure cyberspace. And we strongly believe that proposal commonly known as POA, which got a broad cross-regional support by the UN member states, will ensure continuity of efficiency and sustainability of discussions on ICT security, build on action-oriented and inclusive process, which will further address concerns and needs of all UN member states. We are grateful, Chair, for the discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on ICT security, which identifies main elements for the future mechanism. As our discussions in the recent years have shown, the issue of cyber security will not disappear from our everyday life. It will just become more complex and broader. Hence, it’s important to agree on a strong mechanism which will be able to address those challenges and which will bring added value for international peace and security. France has very well elaborated the constructive proposal for the future mechanism, which will enable inclusive dialogue, continue developing current and future initiatives and actions, promote multilateralism, support capacity building, and enable discussions on the further development of the framework, inclusive through the thematic groups, while preserving a single track process on the issue of ICT security at the UN. We strongly believe that jointly we will be able to find a common ground for a sustainable future mechanism and flexible operating system before the end of the current open-ended working group. Chair, on this International Women’s Day, allow me just a few words on the role of women in ICT security. According to the World Economic Forum, closing the overall gender gap will require 131 years. I repeat, 131 years. Master Yoda will most probably live to experience that moment, but we won’t. So that is why we need to act now. As Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Qatar, South Africa, UK, and many more have mentioned, we need to address gender digital divide and mainstream gender perspective in our efforts in all areas, from dealing with threats, application of international law, implementation of norms, to CBMs and capacity buildings. The International Telecommunication Union reports that more than 50% of the world’s women are offline. This is more pronounced in developing countries, where the internet penetration rate for adult women is 41%, compared to 53% for men. Although there is a little research on gender differences in digital access for children under the age of 18, the limited data available does indicate a similar pattern of lower access of and use for girls as for women. Factors that need to be addressed in closing this gender digital divide can be broadly categorized in three interlinked areas, access, digital literacy, and online safety. Therefore, we call all states and stakeholders to take gender perspective into consideration within national policies and capacity building efforts, so that all together we can bring down few years and reach digital gender equality before 2154. Today, let’s celebrate a great achievement of this working group in empowering women, and afterwards, let’s start to work to bring this good practice also in other areas.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Croatia, for your statement, and also for being a fountain of Master Yoda wisdom. I think we will need all the wisdom we can have to make progress in this working group. I give the floor now to South Africa, to be followed by Canada.

South Africa:
Chairperson, thank you for your tribute to the role of women in international relations on International Women’s Day. Coincidentally, it is Human Rights Month in South Africa, and as we say, women’s rights are human rights. This open-ended working group has conducted its work over the last three years against the backdrop of a difficult geopolitical climate. It was no small feat to have achieved two consensus reports in a row under your able leadership. South Africa has been pleased that we have made steady progress in adopting the Global POC Directory and five new CBMs to support its work. We agree with Member States that a future permanent mechanism should be established to succeed this OEWG after its mandate expires. In this regard, we agree with Brazil and India that your Elements paper is a welcome proposal. We support Brazil’s proposal for a moratorium on competing resolutions during First Committee sessions on this issue. South Africa supports Paris 3A to B. The future mechanism should be a single-track, state-led permanent mechanism with flexibility to include new developments in ICT security and technologies, reporting to the First Committee of the UNGA. The future mechanism should build upon the consensus agreements on the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs from previous OEWG and GGE reports. In the context of the interconnected nature of cyberspace, it would be vital to preserve decision-making by consensus. Chairperson, allow us to offer a few additional thoughts. We believe thematic areas of work could remain the same as in this OEWG in a future permanent mechanism. The development of any future political framework should consider that developing countries are still building their ICT security structures, and therefore voluntary commitments should be the basis of such a framework. Discussion on voluntary commitments, such as norms or CBMs, should be developed without prejudice to the possibility of a future legally binding agreement if Member States see the need for such an instrument. Just as we have had rich discussion on existing and potential threats to ICT security in this OEWG, we should allow the future permanent framework to allow states to develop their common understanding of the ICT threats as technologies develop. Capacity building should remain at the core of any framework for regular institutional dialogue, as you have duly noted in the course of the OEWG. Cooperation on capacity building should operate on the principle of respect for the needs and the context of recipient state or states. The permanent mechanism could be established as a subsidiary body of the First Committee. The UNODA could serve as the secretariat of the permanent mechanism. Formal meetings could be held once or twice a year with intersessional meetings as needed. A global cybersecurity cooperation portal could include a repository of threats and could also share information relevant to the work of the permanent mechanism. Chairperson, our delegation believes that we should make use of this transparent and all-inclusive forum of the OEWG to conduct all discussions on a future regular institutional dialogue mechanism. We are not in favor of parallel ad hoc discussions on proposals we all need to support in order for them to have any chance of effective implementation. Therefore, we look forward to hearing proposals and views of other delegations on a framework for RID. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. South Africa. Canada to be followed by Bangladesh.

Canada:
Mr. Chair, as this is Canada’s last statement for this session, we want to thank you and your team for your skillful guidance over the week. My delegation has been struck by the significant number of substantive statements we have witnessed from many delegations. Many of such statements have been delivered by inspiring women coming from small and developing countries. We have noticed this fact acutely and it renews our enthusiasm for our work here. On this International Women’s Day, we thank each of these women for their incredible work and dedication to making the world more secure. We have also been impressed by the significant common ground across the pillars of our work. Mr. Chair, you are most definitely in the right lane of work, but let me also mention that I think you would have made a great school principal. Of course, as the students in this metaphor, Canada will always aim for an A+. Within our education system, reaching that A-plus level requires proposing innovative solutions, thinking beyond the obvious or the easiest options, and, where necessary, challenging the teacher themselves if the student believes there is a better way forward. With this in mind, let me now turn to the homework you provided us with even before the beginning of this week’s in-person courses. That is, the guiding questions. Canada appreciates your efforts in giving us a hand moving forward on RID through these questions and including in your proposed discussion paper on RID. You asked us to identify additional consensus elements. For Canada, two elements have explicitly and recurrently crystallized over the last OEWG meetings and again resurfaced over the course of this week. The first one is the action-oriented nature of any future RID. Be it in the context of statements on the implementation of norms, on building common understandings on international law, on imparationalizing CBMs or redoubling efforts to deliver capacity building, statements from all regions and levels of development have emphasized again and again that the time to act is now. In this regard, while we very much appreciated our discussions this week, the reality is that this format does not truly allow for action. As you yourself noted in our discussion on international law, the existing OEWG process does not allow for more detailed discussions and requires us to devote equal time to all issues. Simply continuing this format on a permanent basis is not an A-plus idea. Rather, we need to build in structures that allow states to go into greater depth on specific topics with time to debate and build consensus in an action-oriented manner. As we have discussed before, we see the POA as the way to advance this action-oriented proposal through a virtuous cycle of implementation discussions, capacity building, and review of any identified gaps to be addressed. This process needs to transcend the current, sometimes limitative, pillar approach to our discussions. Our discussion on threats is meaningless if states are not also exploring how the positive norms allow them to build resilience to these threats. Implementing those norms require the identification and application of capacity building, and so on. A second element, Mr. Chair, that also transcends all pillars is the inclusive nature of any future RID. States have been vocal about the need to ensure the voice of all can be heard and reflected in our future work. That inclusive nature means, in more specific terms, that states of all sizes and resource circumstances can effectively participate and move towards responsible state behavior in ways that they consider best. To do that, we have heard, again, under each of the pillars discussed this week, that the role of the multi-stakeholder community is simply instrumental. It is necessary to have meaningful progress as we graduate to a new school that we engage stakeholders meaningfully. We point to the non-paper that Chile and Canada helped coordinate and that discusses the invaluable contributions of the multi-stakeholder community to our work and how they could contribute even more. The non-paper is on the OEWG website. The action-oriented nature, on the one hand, and the inclusive nature, on the other hand, are two elements that simply go hand-in-hand for a future RID. Indeed, as we move to further focus on threat assessments and boosting our abilities to mitigate them, we may want in a future RID to engage more deeply into complex and technical subject matters. For this, Mr. Chair, it will be useful to invite guest lecturers and have them provide insights to us in their consultative role. You will have understood that my metaphor of guest lecturers here regards stakeholders. I now turn to the second part of our pre-OEWG meetings homework, and that is your question regarding how to best align synergies and develop the post-OEWG RID. There are different ways to get a good grade on this part of the homework. For Canada, the best way is to put forward our best efforts, our A-plus game or proposal, and then to consistently work with others to really try and identify how we can structure a mechanism that works for all. Such a mechanism that works for all must be ambitious, taking the best from our existing work and looking at how to improve it. Canada commends France for its work on RID since 2020. In our view, France has in the past and continues to now make efforts towards accommodating all viewpoints, including, for instance, the most vocal for a space to further develop the framework. Mr. Chair, during France’s oral exam earlier today, we witnessed that they truly are trying to be constructive and to find a middle ground. We commend their efforts in that regard. Let me also add that I think they should get a bonus point for the effort put into the visual presentation. It seems to me that they took a page from the book of another good student, India, at the December OEWG session. However, Mr. Chair, while we do commend France’s efforts, we do not consider that the result they put forward truly represents where the common ground lies amongst the most studious students in this school. In our opinion, we should be more ambitious. One and a half years away from the final exam, our goal should be to prepare and strive for an A-plus, not to compromise for a B. Mr. Chair, your discussion paper lays out items that need to be decided by this OEWG, and our understanding is that you invite substance to build on your paper, hopefully by truly cross-regional groupings. Canada commits, and I am certain many others do too, to continue working hard to get the best grades possible. Together, we can constructively contribute to shaping a future RID where all of us can access the best opportunities there are for responsible state behavior. Mr. Chair, let me conclude this statement by again taking very good note that today is International Women’s Day. Canada underscores how vital it is to have gender-responsive work in the OEWG and elsewhere at a time where, unfortunately, women’s rights and gender equality is backsliding. I personally remember school as a place where women definitely had the best grades. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Canada, for your very detailed statement, and please do send me your statement in writing, and I will send it back to you with an A-plus. But I think your metaphors are well employed. Thank you for the various comments about using the image of a class or a school, but in a sense, no one’s teaching anyone or no one’s telling anyone what to do. And I think ultimately, the best grade goes to those who help to build consensus. In Singapore, which is grade-obsessed, everyone competes with each other, and they don’t share even their academic notes with each other. And those of us who are still recovering from the Singapore education system, and there are quite a few sitting behind me, will tell you it’s a very competitive and sometimes a zero-sum environment. But the best grades in the context of the United Nations will have to go to those who help to build consensus. And each one of you have a role to play in consensus, because if each one of you is not happy with an outcome or disagrees with an outcome, then the consensus may not become possible. And even if there is a consensus, it may not be a strong consensus. What we need as we graduate to our third cycle into a permanent mechanism is a very strong consensus, and I think it’s possible. So, Canada, thank you very much for reminding all of us. I’m happy to note that I have an alternative career to be a school principal. In Singapore, school principals are very powerful, and I don’t think I have any power here as chair of the OEWG. The power lies with the member states, and the power to build consensus lies with you. So I’m going to count on that. Let’s continue with the speakers’ list. Bangladesh, to be followed by the United Kingdom.

Bangladesh:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, I would like to express my delegation’s heartfelt congratulations to all the distinguished women present in this room and beyond on the occasion of International Women’s Day. We acknowledge and deeply value their invaluable contributions. Chair, my delegation commends your efforts in presenting the chair’s discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on the use of ICT in the context of international security. Bangladesh’s position on regular institutional dialogue is very clear. We reaffirm that a future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue would be a single-track, state-led permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations. It must be open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable, flexible, able to evolve in accordance with a state’s need and developments in the ICT environment. We recognize the importance of the principle of consensus regarding both the establishment of the future mechanism itself and decision-making process of the mechanism. We support Brazil’s proposal for a moratorium on competing regulations in the first committee. Chair, the future mechanism must be action-oriented with a specific focus on capacity building. Regarding the scope, we advocate for discussions on core topics alongside emerging issues like countering disinformation campaigns, including deepfakes, quantum computing, AI-powered hacking, and addressing the use of ICTs for malicious purposes by non-state actors. The foundation of the work of the future mechanism must be consensus agreement on the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs from current as well as previous open-ended working group and GGE reports. To ensure regular dialogue and progress, we are of the view that one substantive session annually with biennial progress reports submitted to the first committee seem most feasible. Dedicated thematic groups on capacity building, international law, and global POC could prove beneficial. Chair, for modernities, we believe anchoring the mechanism as a subsidiary body of the first committee with UNODA as the secretariat would provide the necessary legitimacy and ensure its smooth operation. While we would have preferred to have you as the permanent chair of the future permanent mechanism, however, pending your consent, a two-year term for chair chosen with equitable geographical representation seems a practical approach. We also support the establishment of a bureau to support the chair’s work. While New York appears to be a suitable location for formal meetings, flexibility for inter-sessional meetings in other locations should be explored to facilitate broader participation. Chair, we must ensure that mechanism is inclusive and take proactive measures to facilitate the meaningful participation of smaller states and developing countries, ensuring that their views and perspectives are actively taken on board in its work. We thank France for their comprehensive presentation, and we will carefully review it with other proposals. To conclude, Mr. Chair, my delegation stands ready to make compromise in order to get A++ from you. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Bangladesh, for your A++ intervention. Much as you would like to have a permanent chair, you should know that although the permanent representatives are called permanent representatives, they are anything but permanent. What you need there is a chair who is able to give you a fixed amount of his time, or her time, hopefully her time, when it comes in 2025, when we make the transition to the next mechanism. I give the floor now to the United Kingdom, to be followed by Belarus.

United Kingdom:
Chair, thank you. In the interest of time, I will read a shortened version of my delegation’s statement. Your paper and France’s presentation referred to thematic meetings. We see this as a significant opportunity to advance dialogue on ICT security at the UN, to deepen our common understanding, and to build confidence. Themes might include existing and potential threats, or specific sectors of critical national infrastructure. Thematic discussions should employ scenarios as a discussion tool to identify and foster convergence between states. The agreed UN framework of norms, international law, CBMs, and capacity building could be used to consider each theme in a cross-cutting way. The flexibility of a program of action allows thematic expert briefings, which would add further depth to discussions by states. Experts could include, for example, cyber incident responders, international lawyers, or even victims of cyber incidents. A mechanism that gives more time for delegations to interact with such stakeholders would add immeasurably to our discussions. In this way, dialogue under the future mechanism could become not only a confidence building measure, but also an opportunity to build capacity. Chair, international law will be a particularly important topic under the future mechanism. UNIDIR’s workshop has been cited extensively, but we should have these discussions inside the future mechanism. Future discussions on international law should seek to summarize and consolidate areas of convergence among states on how the UN Charter and the acquis of international law applies in cyberspace. International law capacity building, conducted according to the agreed capacity building principles, should be deployed to support states to participate in such discussions. The outputs of international law discussions under the future mechanism should use hypothetical examples to illustrate the application of international law. This will clarify the uncertainties that have been raised in this OEWG. Chair, it is essential to involve stakeholders if we are to fulfill the functions outlined in your paper. We agree with Switzerland’s proposal on stakeholders. A program of action provides a platform for international law. the flexibility to deliver this and we should take advantage of it. Building on the aim of the future mechanism articulated in the previous APR, we believe that the scope of the future mechanism should clearly relate to the use of ICTs by states and the existing and potential threats to international security arising from this. We would like to see this reflected more clearly in your paper. On the question of meeting frequency, we recognize the need to strike a balance between providing opportunity for progress whilst not overburdening states. The model of periodic review conferences and biannual meetings of states offered by other POAs could be a good example to follow. Within the cycle of review conferences, we should spend a majority of our time on thematic discussions. We support the suggestion made by France relating to voluntary reporting to give an opportunity for states to show how they are meeting our collective commitments. Finally, we strongly support the integration of hybrid meetings into the future mechanism to facilitate the participation of all delegations. Thank you, Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. UK, Belarus, to be followed by Belgium.

Belarus:
Good afternoon. I’m speaking for the first time today, and therefore I’d like to congratulate all women on International Women’s Day. We wish you kindness, love, and a spring in your step as it’s springtime. Mr. Chairman, we’re grateful to you and your team for your leadership and the successful 7th May session. We’re in favour of a consensus decision being taken on the OEWG format post-2025. Such an approach, in our view, will meet the aspirations of all states, first and foremost developing countries, given that they’ll be able to directly continue partaking in the negotiations process on information security. It would appear that the current OEWG format is rather effective and it’s been tested by time. Thus, we’re in favour of endowing the OEWG with a permanent mandate post-2025 with the possibility of keeping the consensus principle in decision-making. At the previous OEWG session, a number of states, including Belarus, put forward a concept paper regarding the establishment of an OEWG with the decision-making powers in the field of ICT security. If the OEWG would work on a permanent basis, it would be able to focus its efforts on continuing to create an open, secure, stable and accessible, as well as peaceful, ICT environment through practical implementation of OEWG agreements. The overarching objective would be the establishment of internationally legally binding norms, rules and principles for the responsible behaviour of states, which would be the elements for a future universal agreement on international information security. On our side, Belarus stands ready to partake in constructive, depoliticised and results-oriented cooperation at the OEWG. Even if today we don’t yet know what will be the final outcome of this process, we are 99% sure who’s going to chair the future OEWG, regardless of the form that it takes. So I think you’ve got a secure job. We know that already. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Belarus. This section is not intended to discuss my retirement plans. I have made other plans. But let’s focus on the substance of the future mechanism. And I thank everyone for all the very good ideas and suggestions that are being put forward. So I give the floor now to Belgium, to be followed by Venezuela. Belgium, please.

Belgium:
Mr. Chair, my country aligns with the statement delivered by the EU and wishes to stress the following elements in its national capacity. First, my delegation would like to thank you for the comprehensive discussion paper. This document provides a good basis to guide our debates on a future permanent, inclusive and action-oriented mechanism under the auspices of the UN. The functions, implementation and capacity building to implement the framework should be top priorities. We should use the opportunity of the upcoming dedicated international meeting to make substantial progress on these elements with a view to the establishment of a permanent mechanism upon the conclusion of the current open-ended working group and no later than 2026. My delegation also supports the presentation by France on the structure of the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue on cyber issues and the single track process it puts forward for our future RID mechanism. Your paper and France propose thematic discussions. Belgium would like to suggest inclusion of a victim-based approach in the future mechanism dedicated to an action-oriented platform for implementation. As we stressed in the opening of our session, cyber-attacks make human victims. People die in hospital because of ransomware or cyber-attacks. People are deprived of basic services because of cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks present real threats. We also recommend the creation of a committee on victim assistance as an action-oriented instrument for the implementation of the normative framework which could be part of the future RID mechanism. The committee on victim assistance would, one, help states increase their understanding of the harm to victims and the human suffering caused by cyber-attacks. Second, exchange on best practices on how to mitigate them. Three, support and guide states in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance. We published a short working paper on the website of the Open Working Group to inform delegations and will organize a side event in an oncoming session. Finally, Mr. Chair, in our work towards designing the future RID mechanism, this group should engage meaningfully with all stakeholders, including civil society and industry, and facilitate their participation in our important work. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Belgium. Venezuela to be followed by Slovakia. Venezuela, please.

Venezuela:
Mr. Chairman, thank you. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela adheres to a paper that was already presented by a total of 13 states in December of 2023, when it proposes the creation of a new permanent open-ended working group, sorry, with a clear and precise mandate and a solid mechanism for negotiations and consensus. A new permanent working group after 2025 should inherit all the great achievements that this actual working group has managed to achieve. Its mandate as well, and also its heavy reliance and consensus, as we have witnessed in the last few years. But it will also inherit its incomplete and unfinished agenda, which of course should dominate future activities and works of that new group. I shall not dwell into all the details of the document that we co-sponsored. It has been available since December of last year for all to read. Instead, I shall add one point to those arguments with the hope of being as brief as possible. Several states, representatives of states, have spoken in this current and past meetings on the issue of binding and non-binding norms, legally binding and non-binding norms, of course. Now, I’m aware that this segment is not about that issue, but I use this notion to address the issue of regular institutional dialogue, so please bear with me. Several states, representatives have mentioned during this and past meetings that now might not be the time to address the issue of binding or non-binding norms. Very well. Then it might not be the time, as they say, and they have mentioned, but that can only mean that eventually it shall be, and hopefully soon, but regardless on when it will be, a debate that can only take place in a multilateral space like this one. Consensus on this issue will take time and efforts. It is absolutely necessary. It will need a lot of both, time and effort. This naturally requires creating, or the creation of a new group with a clear mandate, regardless of how we call this new group, but we must also improve its performance through a more precise mandate and very clear and concrete mechanisms for achieving consensus. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela salutes the optimistic and positive perspective that some fellow representative of states show through their conviction that non-binding norms are sufficient and legally binding norms are unnecessary or unwarranted. Alas, we wish we could have shared such optimism, but unfortunately, looking at the realities of our current world and international relations, we can see how we still debate, disagree. and eventually are paralyzed to take action on what we thought were already issues that were already supposedly clear and also very legally binding. Things can only get much more relative, murky, imprecise and inconclusive when we try to respond to something like cyber attacks and manipulation on the basis on only non-binding norms. Mr. Chairman, the Bolivar Republic of Venezuela does consider that the 11 non-binding norms of good behavior in cyberspace for states to be an excellent starting point, a solid base that can help us go further, eventually to a level where those norms are truly universal. We believe that universality can only be achieved through norms that apply to all, at all times, regardless of geopolitical alliances or particular geopolitical dynamics in any given moment. Now, regardless of how this debate will end, what is undeniable is that it will require efforts and sacrifices, patience and flexibility from all involved, no exceptions. All these issues require time, time that we need to gain through a very needed renewal of a working group and a mandate for it. Finally, I would like to reiterate, and I do not tire to mention this, we need to cooperate, all of us. We need to show flexibility, sacrifice on our positions, because it is us, the delegates and representatives, and not the chairman himself, that will eventually solve this unfortunate but crucial deadlock. Now, I would like to claim that these last words are mine, but in reality, I have borrowed them from our esteemed chairman, our very wise chairman. We need to debate, we need to be flexible, and that needs more time. We need a renewed and reinvigorated mandate for a new working group beyond 2025, but one that maintains a format that we’re all familiar with, a format that we are currently using. That is all, thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Venezuela, for your statement. Slovakia, to be followed by India.

Slovakia:
Mr. Chair, plans change, even for the retirement. But at the beginning, let me also recognize and celebrate the important role that women play in our work here in the UN. Thank you for your contribution, and happy International Women’s Day to everyone. Slovakia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, France, and other co-sponsors of the Program of Action to advance responsible state behavior in the use of ICT. Nevertheless, Slovakia wishes to make its own contribution and add its voice to some of the points that have already been made by other distinguished delegates. Since 2020, when the Program of Action was prepared as a vision for seamless, permanent, and action-oriented continuation of the OEWG, the cross-regional group of countries has stressed the importance of step-by-step approach to building the structure and content of the POA. Now Slovakia appreciates the pragmatic approach of this group and welcomes the Chair’s discussion paper on the proposed common elements for the future mechanism to complement the second annual progress report, as well as the proposal of France for future mechanism. Preserving stable, secure, and predictable cyberspace seems to be the bottom line of all interventions we have heard here so far. Following the discussion on the desired features and functions of the regular institutional dialogue upon conclusion of the OEWG, it is clear to our delegation that the future mechanism ought to, first, support states their capacity-building efforts to implement the framework to responsible state behavior to the best of their abilities. Second, offer a platform to deeper common understanding of agreed norms and potential obligations. And third, include relevant voices, also from stakeholder community, to contribute to our discussion moving forward. Importantly, since the POA aims to compromising existing practical initiatives agreed under the OEWG, such as the Global POC Directory and relevant CBMs, the substantive discussion on the program’s modalities could certainly build on these further. To similarly draw on the recently published draft norms implementation checklist, the goal is also to encourage states to report on their implementation progress, or needs that could be addressed via the program of action. As for the structure, there is a need to emphasize that the POA natures would not be static, but dynamic, flexible and receptive to the changing security environment in cyberspace. Therefore, POA could establish regular review conferences to touch upon, for instance, the evolving cyber threats landscape. Some of those activities shall require specific expertise, oftentimes technical and or legislative nature, which could be utilized during respective POA’s working groups, meetings whose frequency would be decided at the later stage, depending on the topic’s urgency. As co-sponsor of the program of action, Slovakia does not perceive the discussion on the POA as contradicting the OEWG mandate. On the contrary, we see the debates of the program of action’s future scope and modalities as a wish of all UN member states to further develop existing initiatives, while elaborating on them post-2025 in a more suitable format. Mr. Chair, while the overwhelming support of the UN member states for the recent resolution 7816 serves as a testament to the desire to establish the program of action under the auspice of the United Nations no later than 2026, we are nowhere near the finish line. While expecting more detailed discussion on the regular institutional dialogue, Slovakia would like to express our appreciation to the work carried out by your team and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, and would like to offer our continued support and cooperation. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Slovakia, for your statement. India, to be followed by Czechia. India, please.

India:
Mr. Chair, India thanks you and your team for your efforts to advance discussions on the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue mechanism on international security related to ICTs, particularly the Chair’s discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on ICT security. India believes that any future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations should be single track, open and inclusive with an action-oriented and consensus-based process with specific objectives, building on previous outcomes and be transparent, results-based with clear decision-making role of states, encouraging the equal participation of all member states. ensuring that the structure and format of the mechanism be conducive for the participation of small member states, and also for developing and least-developed member states. India has examined various proposals from member states, outlining their conception of a mechanism to succeed the current OEWG. We appreciate their efforts in this respect. We are pleased to note that the convergences between the proposals outnumber by far any points of divergence. This bodes well for all of us, because there are enough common elements of such a mechanism on which consensus exists, by and large, and that provides the OEWG a stable platform on which to conceptualize and build a mechanism that would find broad agreement among countries. Echoing what Brazil and South Africa already said, India would like to reiterate that any proposal on regular institutional dialogue should be considered only within this OEWG. India is also favorably disposed towards Brazil’s proposal for a moratorium on First Committee resolutions till the end of the OEWG’s mandate. India remains committed to support you, Mr. Chair, in this endeavor. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, India, for your statement. And I share your assessment that the elements of convergence, in fact, outnumber the points of divergence. And that’s precisely what we need to do to see how we can narrow the elements of divergence such that we can attain consensus. Very good. Let’s proceed with the statement. Czechia, to be followed by Indonesia.

Czechia:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’m honored to join others and congratulate all women on International Day. I highly appreciate that we have been working here together in a constructive way and in mutual respect. Czechia alliance itself is the EU statement and wishes to emphasize a couple of points on its national capacity. Czechia has been favorable to the creation of the POA on cybersecurity within the UN framework since the POA was firstly proposed in 2020. UNG resolutions 78-16 and 77-37 from last year and the year before confirmed that we are now at a stage where the vast majority of member states support the establishment of POA as a parliament-inclusive and action-oriented mechanism upon conclusion of the current open-ended working group no later than 2026. So at this point, we, as the international community, have a little over a year to fine-tune the shape of POA so that it works effectively to benefit for all of us. In this context, we fully support proposal presented today by France. We also appreciate the Chair’s discussion paper on draft elements for the parliament mechanism. This paper adequately summarizes the debate that has been taking place within the open-ended working group on common elements that future institutional dialogue should meet. We believe that this discussion has helped to shape POA in the right direction and so far has clarified a number of potentially controversial points. Czechia would like to highlight what we consider to be the important advantages of the POA. First, POA would support implementation of the framework of responsible state behavior and enable discussion on further development of the framework if needed. Second, POA would focus extensively on capacity building. And third, POA would ensure meaningful participation and cooperation with non-governmental stakeholders. In addition, we like that POA is intended to be primarily an umbrella framework and could include other initiatives that have been discussed or agreed within the open-ended working group. For example, global POC directory or platform for sharing information such as the Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal that was proposed by India. We also favor if UNODA could perform a role of the Secretariat of POA. Regarding the structure of POA, we especially favor the idea of intersessional technical meetings and working groups on specific areas of work that could be organized within the POA as it was shown in the slide presented by our French colleague at the beginning of this panel. The scope and preparatory work of the technical discussions would be limited to topic-identified and plenary sessions and would be attended, for example, by limited number of experts from governments and, when relevant, from other stakeholders such as academia. In particular, their working group could focus on topics such as protection of critical infrastructure, cyber incident response, applicability of concrete provisions of international law in cyberspace, et cetera. If this is set up well, we believe that having intersessional technical working group can make our work significantly more efficient and also reduce the burden on individual delegations. In this context, we also see that the chair’s paper on elements for permanent mechanism contains a very interesting idea that not all intersessional working group meetings would necessarily have to be held in New York. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Shakir, for your statement. Indonesia to be followed by Israel.

Indonesia:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our discussion on the regular institutional dialogue is crucial as it would lay the ground to ensure the continuity of the discussion throughout the five years of this OEWG. And therefore, we must be ambitious and action-oriented yet flexible in our discussion. Mr. Chair, Indonesia welcomes the chair’s paper as it provides a good basis for our discussion and to which we can further develop as we go along with deliberating the future mechanism of ICT in the context of international security. We also take note of the resolution on the program of action, and we appreciate the presentation earlier by the delegation of France as a foot for thought. We are of the view that the discussion on regular institutional dialogue must build upon the chair’s paper on the scope and other modalities. We must therefore also avoid proliferation and duplication in the cybersecurity process as it is apparent in other processes which made it more difficult to bring about the result and benefit that we all desire. Mr. Chair, in this opportunity, Indonesia wishes to offer our views on the discussion paper. First, as a general comment, we appreciate that the discussion paper reflects on the common elements agreed by consensus in the second APR. We view that the paper is an attempt to build convergence from the ground up. The deliberation process on cybersecurity issues is important to enable us to reap the utmost benefit in cyberspace and therefore should serve two objectives which are creating rules and norms for a secure and safe cyberspace and ensuring that all countries share the same capabilities to respond to the increasing threats in cyberspace. In this regard, while we view that the future mechanism must reflect such balance, the mechanism must also be single track, inclusive and agreed by consensus. Our endeavor should be guided to promote achievement of concrete results and building trust should be our shared goal from this process. Second, on the scope and other modalities of future mechanism, we believe that the scope of the permanent mechanism should continue to bring up the thematic topics discussed within the OEWG. Any future mechanism should also ensure the maturity of the process. Active participation of all countries in an inclusive manner are key to the success of the process. An inclusive and constructive. This approach would also contribute in building a strong global cybersecurity ecosystem, which is crucial given the interlinked nature of the threats in cyberspace that knows no boundaries. As the chain is as strong as its weakest link, capacity-building agendas shall continue to be the strong feature in the permanent mechanism. This will assist countries in enhancing their cybersecurity capabilities and to enable them to carry out meaningful participation as a building block of a resilient future process. As for the detail on the modalities of the future mechanism, we would open for any proposals that could gain consensus from all member states. In this regard, we also call for all countries to work on the convergence elements rather than highlight the divergence in our views. Finally, Indonesia reaffirms its commitment in supporting the work of the OEWG, which has provided a space for countries to share views and ideas concerning a secure and stable cyberspace at a pace comfortable to all with the step-by-step and incremental approach. This format has been able to yield concrete results. In this context, we look forward to further operationalization of the Global POC Directory as well as the achievement of other concrete outcomes this year. We need to continue to reach common grounds for the establishment of future mechanisms building upon the work of the OEWG. This would be achieved if we exercise our flexibility and commit collectively towards a safe and secure cyberspace for the current and future generations.

Israel:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor. We wish to join all our colleagues here and congratulate our fellow women on International Women’s Day. We would like to join this constructive conversation and share our positions on the topic of regular institutional dialogue, including some remarks on the future POA. Israel holds the position that it is important to continue conducting an inclusive and transparent global discussion on matters pertaining to security of ICTs and their use. The question of what should be the exact mechanism of such a regular institutional dialogue is directly related to its possible mandate, modalities, and characteristics. Israel is of the view that for the sake of inclusiveness and effectiveness of such a dialogue, the framework for such a dialogue on ICT security should be inclusive, transparent, and of a voluntary and non-legally binding in nature. Any other type of framework carries the risk to alienate and drive away some of the relevant actors. In this context, Israel also believes that as cybersecurity and cyber resilience are key elements of state’s national security, it is essential that any future framework will be consensus-based. Mr. Chair, like many of our distinguished colleagues have stressed before us today, any chosen institutional dialogue should avoid duplication or FORA fragmentations, and it should optimize the use of resources and maintain a practical and focused process. Like many other Member States, we also anticipate that we might encounter some difficulties equally contributing and fully engaging with a parallel or multiple processes. Regarding the POA, we wish to thank France for the presentation today on the modalities and principles of their initiative. Israel believes that there could be several potential advantages to creating a future POA serving as the sole UN mechanism for discussing the framework and all pillars of cybersecurity issues on the global level, and we support to continue to elaborate and develop this proposal within the open-ended working group framework. We have persistently made clear that it is imperative all decision on substantial matters in the POA be taken based on the principle of consensus. This principle should apply both to the negotiation processes itself, leading to the creation of that mechanism, as well as to decision-making processes within the mechanism. As cybersecurity issues have the potential to affect all states’ fundamental national security interests, we wish to see it clearly stated as part of the POA’s modalities. It is our expectation that this essential and widely observed principle will be safeguarded in text and put into practice in the next phase of deliberations and during the creation of any future POA. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, Israel continues to support the idea of creation of a POA, but the way forward must base all decision-making processes on substantial matters in the process to and within this POA on the principle of consensus, and especially while discussing the modalities of such a POA. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you. Israel. China, to be followed by Republic of Korea.

China:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Discussion on a permanent mechanism bears on the long-term development of the UN process on ICT security and is the most important aspect of our work. Based on the in-depth discussions in this group, the second APR last year registered important consensus on the common elements of the permanent mechanism, including a single UN auspices, government-owned, and consensus-based, among other important principles. This fully demonstrates that reaching consensus on the permanent mechanism within OEWG framework serves as our only and most feasible option. China notes with appreciation the discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism circulated by the Chair before the session, which, based on the consensus contained in last year’s annual report. puts forward many concrete proposals on the mechanism, it is a good basis for future discussions. In addition, since last year, various parties, China and Russia included, have put forward numerous proposals and ideas on the future mechanism, which we hope will be fully considered. In our view, the permanent mechanism should, on the one hand, look back, focusing on observing and implementing the current framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and consolidating the major achievements of the UN process on ICT security, and, on the other hand, look ahead, focusing on formulating new norms, including those on data security, and facilitating the drafting of relevant legal instruments from a future-oriented and long-term perspective. Furthermore, the permanent mechanism should incorporate functions of both decision-making and deliberation, observe the principle of consensus, and be driven by member states. It must also ensure multi-stakeholder participation by following the current modalities of OEWG. China stands ready to fully exchange views with member states, seek common ground while putting aside differences, build and expand consensus, actively facilitate potential substantive progress towards a permanent mechanism in the future. In addition, China wishes to reiterate its position on the application of international law. OEWG, as an intergovernmental process, must exercise maximum precautions against indiscriminate copy and paste of IHL into cyberspace, and must exercise maximum precautions against any proposal that might encourage or legitimize cyber conflicts, so as not to send wrong messages to the international community. In view of this, China firmly opposes introducing scenario-based discussion under OEWG framework. Last but not least, since this is China’s last statement in the current OEWG, we would like to thank the Chair for his excellent and outstanding leadership and for his work in pushing for consensus. Thank you.

Republic of Korea:
My delegation would like to reaffirm its position that we should continue the discussion under the Consensus Agreement on the Framework of Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs from previous OEWG and GGE reports. ROK welcomes the detailed presentation of France and would like to reiterate its support for the re-establishment of Program of Action as the future forum for regular institutional dialogues that are permanent, organized, inclusive, practical, and action-oriented. We believe the POA will best serve this purpose by promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable ICT environment. We greatly appreciate Chair for the discussion paper and would like to make comments on some of the elements. We are generally open to its structure and modalities of the future mechanism. Furthermore, given that non-state actors mostly drive ICT advancements, the future mechanism should not rule them out in discussions. As to the scope of the discussion, the future mechanism should still incorporate the topics under the current OEWG since the group has benefited from states sharing their views and experiences. To conclude, my delegation underscores the urgency of facilitating establishment of the permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Islamic Republic of Iran.

Islamic Republic of Iran:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will do my best to summarize my intervention to receive A+. Establishing regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations is one of the key mandates of the current OEWG. Pushing forward any format of the future dialogue on international information security outside the OEWG is absolutely unacceptable. Mr. Chair, the open-ended working group has substantiated its efficiency and relevance in practice, making it the most effective format to be retained for ongoing regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN after 2025. In contrast to the POA program of action, the scope, content, and structure of which still remain unclear, a distinct concept paper on a permanent decision-making open-ended working group on the security of and in the use of information and communication technologies has been submitted by a group of 13 states. It is appropriate for the OEWG to engage in a more comprehensive and detailed discussion and examination of this proposal. Mr. Chair, aligned with the insightful intervention made by our colleague from Venezuela regarding the imperative for legally binding norms, we also believe that after a long history of 25 years of discussion on ICT security under the auspices of the United Nations, it is appropriate time for the OEWG to recommend the establishment of an ad hoc framework post 2025 to elaborate a comprehensive international convention aimed at realizing the collective aspirations of the international community for the exclusively peaceful use of ICT for the common good of humankind. Mr. Chair, my delegation would like to express its appreciation for the Chair’s discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on ICT security. While this document is still under interagency consideration, I would like to take this opportunity to provide some preliminary comments on the discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism. First, future mechanisms should be intergovernmental, consensus-based. based, democratic, and non-political. Second, future mechanism should take into account the concerns and interests of all states through equal state participation in a fair and balanced manner. Third, outcome documents of future mechanism should be finalized based on the practice of paragraph-by-paragraph negotiation exercise. Fourth, engagement with non-state actors should adhere to the modalities established by the present OEWG. Fifth, the mandate and scope of the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue should focus inter alia on the creation of a conflict-free, development-oriented, transparent, fair, moral, and peaceful ICT environment, development of new and legally binding norms, establishing a permanent mechanism and fund for capacity building for ICT within the United Nations, outlining a multilateral, democratic, just, and transparent global Internet governance system with equal participation and joint decision-making of all countries, and addressing the responsibility of the private sector and platforms with extraterritorial impact. Finally, my delegation welcomes the incorporation of the following elements in the chair’s discussion paper. Appointment of the chair of the permanent mechanism based on the equitable geographical representation, establishing a bureau for the permanent mechanism based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution, establishment of dedicated thematic groups focused on specific issues, and the possibility of convening the formal and interstitial meetings of the permanent mechanism at other appropriate locations, including the U.N. office in Geneva beyond the U.N. headquarters in New York. Once again, my delegation expresses appreciation to you, Ambassador Ghafour, your team, and the Secretariat for your hard and dedicated work during this session, as well as the entire process. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. Japan, next speaker.

Japan:
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan believes a regular institutional dialogue should be an action-oriented permanent framework which could enable the effective implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior. In this regard, Japan, as a co-sponsor, supports General Assembly Resolution 78-44 on the program of action, which was supported by 161 member states. The program of action should serve as an action-oriented platform to support the efforts of individual countries by promoting the exchange of best practices and identifying specific challenges that member states confront. As we discussed in the threat section, threats in cyberspace are constantly increasing and evolving. We need to establish this mechanism immediately after the conclusion of the current OEWG so that there will be no gap in the UN mechanisms. Japan emphasizes it is important for us to reach a consensus by seeking convergence through concrete discussions on the future mechanism. To this end, we should advance our discussions at the OEWG on the scope, structure, realistic time frame, content, and modalities of the future mechanism, taking into account the Secretary General’s report, the views expressed by states therein, regional consultations, and dialogues with relevant stakeholders. In this regard, Japan appreciates the presentation by the French delegation on the structure of the future mechanism, which was clear, constructive, and helpful for accelerating concrete discussions. Like it has been already said by France and other delegations, Japan also believes that the POA should be inclusive, ensuring broad participation of member states and non-governmental stakeholders. We also would like to reiterate the importance of multi-stakeholder approach. Mr. Chair, Japan would like to express its appreciation for the Chair’s initiative in preparing the discussion paper on draft elements for the permanent mechanism on ICT security. Japan believes the paper is beneficial in advancing concrete discussions. We welcome the proposal of additional elements in the discussion paper, as the paper has been prepared based on the results of the previous discussions within the OEWG, and we look forward to continue discussing them. Furthermore, supporting states in the implementation of the norms through complementary coordination on capacity building and emphasis on promoting cooperation with multi-stakeholders could be added to the common elements. Mr. Chair, Japan stands ready to make utmost contributions to the discussions to reach consensus at the OEWG, including through its dedicated sessions to discuss proposals on a regular institutional dialogue. Before I end, I would like to also add my voice to so many delegates who congratulated today’s International Women’s Day and amplified the sentiment of celebration to all women in this room. And since this is my last intervention this week, I would also like to extend our sincere thankfulness to you, to your leadership, and all the work done by your team. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Japan, for your statement. Thank you very much, Japan. I was just consulting with the Secretariat as to how long we can go further. The interpreters have given us 10 minutes extra. We have about 12 more speakers, so we will certainly not be able to do justice to everyone this evening. So this is what I would like to propose. First, I would like to propose that we keep the speakers’ list as it is, and it is my intention to convene a virtual informal meeting in about two weeks’ time. And at that virtual informal meeting, to continue to take as a priority the remaining speakers, and also give others an opportunity to come in with additional views at that point. So that is the first point that I want to make. It’s too early because the debate is not concluded, but I do want to say that I’m very, very encouraged by this discussion. First of all, I think I want to thank the French delegation for their presentation, very clear and detailed presentation. So I thank them for that. I think it set the stage for this discussion today. Second, I want to thank all of you for the different comments and reactions and suggestions and ideas that you have put forward today. We have just begun this discussion, so I’m not wrapping it up. So what I’m about to say is not a summary by any means. But I was also very encouraged by the many references to the chair’s paper as a good basis for further discussions, as a good starting point to continue to build on and identify further common elements. And quite a number of you also pointed out to the many common elements between what has been said in the paper, but also what has been said in the chair’s discussion paper, but also what has been put forward by the French delegation in the presentation, but also the proposals that have been put forward by the Russian Federation in terms of its own proposal for a permanent OEWG. I think the point is that there are many common elements between the different papers on the table, and these common elements outnumber the points of divergence, as India observed. So I think that gives me a lot of encouragement, and it is my intention to continue the discussion on that basis, that we continue to identify common elements and see how we can narrow the differences such that we would be in a position eventually to have consensus. Many of you stressed the point that we should continue this discussion within the OEWG and not outside the OEWG, and in that context the idea of a moratorium on resolutions in the first committee was mentioned by Brazil and echoed by a few others. I think this is something I invite all of you to reflect upon very carefully, bring it back to capital. As a peace-loving person, I am in favour of all kinds of moratorium. This is something. that I invite all of you to reflect carefully because ultimately if we are all committed to working within the OEWG to find common element, it is also important as a demonstration of trust that we remain committed to pursuing the discussion within this framework. So I think, I believe it is in that context that Brazil had put forward that proposal. Then many of you suggested a single-track approach. This is something that we have agreed as part of our common element and many of you also emphasize the need for continuity in terms of and seamlessness in terms of how we transition to a new mechanism. So I’m very encouraged by this discussion. I think as we continue this discussion it’s important that we focus on the function and not the form. We focus on the action, not the acronym. We focus on the substance and not the semantics. So to repeat, let’s focus on function, let’s focus on action, let’s focus on substance and let’s not be distracted by the form, the acronym and the semantics. I think there is a strong desire for on the part of everyone and a strong commitment on the part of everyone to work together to find consensus and many of you are deeply desirous of getting a good grade, I can tell. That is a clear indication of your commitment to find consensus and I find that also very encouraging and I would also think that each one of you would take back the message at this discussion that there is a strong commitment to find common ground in order to design a future mechanism that will transition smoothly to a future mechanism so that we continue the very important work and we continue the progress that we have made within the context of this OEWG. So that is by way of some quick reflections. I also want to say that as we wrap up this week’s discussion that this has been a super productive week for me from my point of view. I hope you feel that same way. This has also been a super constructive week. The constructiveness is evident in the tone, in the interactions between delegations, in the outreach, in the side events, in the informal discussions. So I hope also that as you leave New York and leave this working group at the end of this week, you will leave imbued with this sense of positive energy that you have witnessed in this room and take it back with you to your capitals and share with people back in capitals that you do sense a very strong commitment on the part of every delegation to work together, to be concrete, to be action-oriented, to find common ground and to take concrete steps forward. There’s a lot of follow-up that we need to do. So what I will do as we wrap up this week is I will send out, first I will reflect on how we should organize our intersessional meeting in May. So I will send out details on the POC launch on the 9th of May. I’m continuing my discussion with the Secretariat in terms of how we can best structure the POC launch on the 9th of May. That’s point number one. Point number two is the global roundtable on capacity building. I’m continuing my discussion also with the Secretariat and also with other stakeholders such as UN agencies including the ITU in terms of how we can organize the global roundtable in the best way. So I will send out details on the POC directory launch and the capacity building roundtable but in the meantime do process the invitations, do take it up with your ministers, do encourage and urge them to be present here in May because this week has demonstrated that capacity building is so cross-cutting in a very real way. It’s related to everything that we do and the global roundtable is going to be a very strategic opportunity for all of us, member states and also stakeholders, to really have a solid understanding and make a solid step forward. And then I will also send out a notification for the resumption of this discussion on regular institutional dialogue. I apologize that we have not been able to give everyone a chance today so my sincere apologies to the remaining speakers and they are Australia, Uruguay, Georgia, Netherlands, Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Germany, Philippines and Singapore. So we’ll take note of these requests for the floor. We are not shutting you out. We will give you each a chance to respond as a matter of priority when we reconvene. So the second thing I want to say with regard to regular institutional dialogue is that I am not going to rush into revising this paper, discussion paper, that I’ve put forward. It’s there on the table. I want to, when we meet again virtually in two weeks time, continue the discussion, hear additional views. Some of you said that your capitals are still looking at it so you will have another chance to come back. And then after that, after our virtual informal meeting in two weeks time, I’ll give some thought as to how I can improve the paper. So it is my intention to work on a revised paper around mid-April, so that by the time you come back in May, we will have another opportunity to have another round of discussion. And also keep in mind that we agreed that there will be two dedicated informal sessions for RID, regular institutional dialogue. So in May will be the first dedicated session on regular institutional dialogue and I’ll have to allocate another one. So I want to assure you, each one of you, this is an important issue and we will allocate the time through one way or another, in person or virtually. So I don’t want any of you to get the impression that because RID is the last item on the heavy list of topics we have, that somehow it gets shortchanged. No. So I apologize that we are not able to give everyone a chance today, but I’ll make up for it through a virtual meeting where we can have as much time more as needed to get into further the discussion. So that in a way is a sort of a wrap-up. I have also been advised by the Secretariat that we do have to consider agenda item six, other matters. And under agenda item six, other matters, I’d like to give the floor to Australia. Give the floor for two minutes.

Australia:
Thank you so much, Chair. Yesterday you invited further presentations, and I have taken you at your word. So while I don’t want to stand between everyone and your weekends, given the fortuitous day in which we meet, I beg your indulgence for literally two minutes to very briefly provide an update on the statistics which Australia and the ODA Secretariat have collected this week. As many of you know and have emphasised, women are differently and uniquely affected by threats to international peace and security, and yet starkly, as set out in UNIDIR’s still-behind-the-curve report on the screen in front of you, compared with other UN committees, women remain significantly unrepresented in disarmament and international security processes, except here. In our open-ended working group, we have walked the walk, and we are meaningfully implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. If you’d go to the second slide, please. Where our collective and combined efforts, supported by the people on the podium, by member states, by missions, by capitals, by stakeholders, and by individuals of all genders, means that this is the first-ever forum under the UN First Committee to achieve gender parity of interventions. If we can go to the third slide, and this is probably the one that you want to take a photo of for your reporting, I want to thank Catherine and the Secretariat in particular, and also Elise, who compiled this presentation, for pulling together these statistics, where you can see that we remain consistent, and we’re consistently kicking goals in this OEWG to tangibly contribute to gender equality. This session, once again, over 50% of interventions were made by women. Happy International Women’s Day.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Australia, for giving us the data, for being the custodian and accountant on this very important issue, and given that today is International Women’s Day, it’s appropriate that we reflect on the data. It’s very gratifying that the participation and engagement of women is rising in this working group, and that is a piece of good news for all of us. But participation is just one aspect, as we also heard today. We need to also look at it in a holistic way, but this puts us in the right direction, and I thank all the women representatives here for their very important role this week, and I also thank the stakeholder community and the women leaders in the stakeholder community for their leadership and contribution today as well. Now, I noticed that we lag behind the third committee. In many ways, we need to catch up. The third committee is also known for organizing some very fun parties. I think that is one area where I think perhaps representatives here can reflect on how we can catch up on that, so I leave that in the hands of distinguished representatives of the first committee who are resident in New York to reflect how we can do better in that domain, keeping in mind that such parties are also a form of confidence-building measure. The other thing I want to recognize today is that our dear friend, the distinguished delegate, Ms. Gordina Hector-Mirel from Antigua and Barbuda is celebrating her birthday today, so I want to wish her. So Gordina, I’m sorry that you had to spend your birthday in the basement of the UN, but let it be said that it was for a very good cause and your presence and contribution is very much appreciated. So friends, with that, we have considered agenda item six, other matters. Let me check with the secretary if I’ve left anything out. Very good, it seems I haven’t left anything out. So on that note, for me to close the meeting, I thank you all very, very much for your patience and for your kindness towards me and my team and all your expressions of support for me and the chair’s team. Thank you very much. We are in this together. We will get this done working together and working closely. And I wish you all a safe flight back home for those who are traveling home, for others in New York. Have a great weekend and I look forward to seeing all of you in person or virtually very soon. The meeting is adjourned, thank you.