Final plenary session and adoption of the interim report

Insights into the Art of Diplomacy: Navigating International Negotiations with Expert Guidance

During an engaging and comprehensive diplomatic training session, participants were given a deep dive into the intricacies of international negotiations. The session was led by Ljupco Gjorgjinski, an experienced diplomat, who shared his seasoned insights on the critical elements that underpin successful diplomatic negotiations. Emphasizing the importance of timing, strategy, and managing the negotiation’s tempo, Gjorgjinski drew parallels between the dynamics of diplomacy and basketball, where controlling the pace can be decisive. He highlighted the need for vigilance against potential strategic manoeuvres by other delegations, such as delaying tactics or disengagement, which could signal underlying strategies at play.

Gjorgjinski also discussed the distinction between formal and informal diplomacy, sharing personal techniques he employs to maintain neutrality and objectivity when chairing meetings. By referring to himself in the third person, he reminded himself of his role as the chair and the need to keep emotions in check. The session explored the various types of documents used in diplomatic negotiations, including non-papers, conference room papers, and working papers, each with its own significance and impact on the negotiation process.

Dr Katherine Getao and other panellists shared their experiences and the unique challenges faced by developing countries in diplomatic settings. They pointed out the constraints such as limited resources, the necessity for technical and legal expertise, and the difficulties in ensuring that national positions are well-articulated and understood. The role of non-state actors, including civil society and the private sector, was examined, with opinions divided on their influence on the negotiation process. While some governments acknowledged the value of multistakeholder contributions, others expressed concerns about potential biases and influences.

Participants engaged in a robust discussion about the importance of distinguishing between a country’s national positions and its deeper national interests. Gjorgjinski stressed that understanding the core interests is crucial for both delegates and chairs to focus on the most important aspects of negotiations and to find consensus.

As the session neared its conclusion, participants expressed a desire to end the day’s proceedings early to allow for personal time and exploration of the local area. The facilitators, while sympathetic to the request, emphasized the importance of completing the programme as planned, citing the ECOWAS Commission’s mandate to build capacity for the region. After some negotiation, a short break was agreed upon before concluding the discussions.

The session wrapped up with an acknowledgment of the need for a balance between intensive training and personal downtime. The facilitators encouraged participants to provide feedback on the support needed, highlighting the importance of continuous dialogue and improvement in diplomatic training programmes. The training session offered valuable insights into the art of diplomacy, underscoring the need for careful consideration of timing, strategy, and the ability to discern underlying interests beyond stated positions.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
go to say that you’ll keep the complex things until the end. But then, if you see a strategy like that developing by somebody, then you counteract it in time. If you see that some delegation is not engaging properly in the beginning or end, or postponing things, then you know something is brewing. You don’t just take it as, ah, everything is going well, because I’ve seen that many times in negotiations. It looks like everything is going perfectly. This delegation is not doing anything problematic. And all of a sudden, we come at two o’clock in the morning on the last moments of negotiations, and we get to the most complex things. Within time, usually when there is a negotiation, it’s meant to be from, let’s say, Monday, whatever, June 1st until Friday, June 5th. And that means usually ending at 1800 hours, because that’s when you have interpreters, and you finish by then. And the thing that is said at that time, if they need to continue, is that we’re stopping the clock. We’re stopping at the clock at 6 p.m. Friday, June 5th, let’s say. So that gives you another idea of this importance of time. The timing is that part where, how does a chair introduce a given paper, or idea when is that being used. And the tempo is how fast is it going. Sometimes it’s fast, sometimes it’s slow. I don’t know if you’re watching basketball. Let me use a basketball analogy. One of my favorite players comes from our region, Luka Doncic. He just played last night in the finals. Many people think he’s slow. Look at him. How can he be so good? Well, he is, at the moment, perhaps the most dominant basketball player in the world. He’s managing the tempo. The whole game revolves around him. When he wants the game to go fast, it goes fast. When he wants the game to go slow, it goes slow. That’s about managing tempo. And that, in diplomatic terms, is also something that needs to be understood. How do you manage tempo? How do you adapt it to the tempo that is imposed on you? Do you allow it to? So these three things, time planning and tempo, are a really powerful way of looking at diplomatic processes and seeing how to use it in your own way and seeing how that can be used against you if you’re not careful. And by the way, we got to that. We got to a point when you were tired, when you have had enough, perhaps not just because of these two days of simulation, because of what came before that, and you were ready to accept all of it, right? So you have to be careful there because that can be used against you, whether it is your stomach or your body being tired. Are you ready to give up on national interests because all of a sudden your body is telling you, I want to relax. I’m tired of this. I don’t want to go. Or do you have that in you to push it a bit more because of national interests, because of personal interests, whatever it is? It’s very important for you to figure that out with yourself and make that agreement with yourself. Are you willing to compromise just because you felt tired? So it’s an important thing to bear in mind. Another thing that perhaps is clear is this idea of form and function. And I think it’s very important in diplomacy to understand both. To a degree, we try to make that visible when we are going into formal mode and when we’re going into informal. This reference to myself as the chair, the third person, was a way to signal when we were going into informal. But I’ll tell you, that’s something I do really when I chair. When I chair, I refer to myself as the chair. And for me, that’s an exercise to keep in mind that I’m not the group chair at that time. I’m not this person. I am the embodiment of that meeting. And I need to do that to remind myself. I’ve gone through that process with myself because when I saw, at one moment, when I was chairing a complex body, that my emotions were being imposed on the room, I understood that it is very important, first of all, that I took my emotions in check. And for me to do that, referring to myself as the third person was a very powerful way to remind myself of that. So, it wasn’t just to keep everybody reminded of this. It was to remind myself. Every time I use the chair in formal meetings, not just here, it was a way for me to go into that. I’ve actually done something else. Whenever I chair a formal meeting, this is my thing, we share it. I always wear a black suit, white shirt, black tie. It’s like a uniform. When I do it in the morning, it’s like a reminder to myself, okay, now you’re doing this. You’re the chair of that meeting. You need to, again, self-remind. So, these are little tricks that I shared that are mine, but I hope to convey the importance of this form and the function. It’s very important to understand the form of diplomacy. It’s very important to understand the rules of procedure, to study them, to understand them. know how to use them and to know how not to be used against you. Because there are some that are masters of them. The big states put a lot of effort in it. I would say Russia usually has all diplomats master the rules of procedure and they do it very, very skillfully. When you can use the rules of procedure to your interest, that’s a powerful method. It’s important to understand form. It’s important to understand what is a formal paper, what is an informal paper, what is a non-paper. So for instance, we could have had three different types of documents. We could have had a non-paper. A non-paper is an informal paper. It has no weight, no value. It’s just something to focus the attention of everyone. A non-paper can be by a delegation, it can be by the chair, but it’s something where you look at it. And if it is by the chair, you always can say, well, it’s just a non-paper. Relax. If somebody says, well, what is this? What is that? It’s just a non-paper for the chair to test the ground, what’s going on, right? The document that we introduced this morning in the practice, for instance, of Geneva, I think to a great degree in New York, could have been called a conference room paper. It has the designation CRP slash 17 or four or whatever it is. It’s just a document. It’s a formal document that is introduced within the work of the meeting. A working paper, a WP, can be a document that is given by a delegation or by the chair. All of these are important to understand as different types of documents that are introduced that have different weights, because delegations will react differently to a document that is a non-paper, a conference room paper, a working paper. Because a working paper goes into the record, a non-paper does not. So some delegations will want to stop the issuance of a conference room paper or a working paper. They don’t want it in the record at all. So again, form and function. What are each of them? So I’ll end there. I won’t go into too much other things. I would leave to any questions you may have while we’re in this conversation of the process itself. But yeah, this is the kind of framework to our discussion that I proposed. So if any of you want to jump in on that, please feel free to do so. And then we can answer that.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Floor is open. Any reflections, any comments on what he generally presented? But also maybe on how the chair led the process? And any other aspects of the procedures and the flow of the process that you recognize? Any of your personal reflections? Feel free. Just raise your hand. You don’t need to raise the plate. Just raise your hand. Yeah, I’ll bring in the meantime the headphones. Anyone?

Panelists:
Merci beaucoup. D’abord, j’aimerais remercier les organisateurs de cette formation. Je n’imaginais pas qu’on apprendre autant en arrivant ici. Je crois que mes collègues, en fait, ici, présents, ont cette épreuve la même joie que moi. Au cours de la discussion, surtout lors de la session de simulation, il y a effectivement une chose qui m’a vraiment impressionné, c’était cette façon de diriger la réunion. C’est vrai que ce dossier, en nous apprenant, It was bad to lead the meeting, but there was, indeed, here, and especially during the direction of the meeting, the interventions, the very form that the interventions took, I found them really of quality. We may not all be diplomats here, but I really appreciated the idea of style. There is a whole culture, a whole set of rites and rituals that frame the way we react in different conversations. The element that I analysed a lot was to find the right moment, especially on the tempo, the right moment to react. In fact, this is also a subject that concerns us, because indeed, in our files, we had red lines that had to be monitored to make sure that, apart from these red lines, the others were in agreement. And also, out of the frame, to negotiate a little in the informal discussion. These are things that my teams and I did quite regularly. Frankly, this is something that I really appreciated. There is a point that I would like to understand a little better. It is on the formal and informal part. There are speakers, including civil society, who were among us. There were also representatives of private companies who gave their opinion. How did this opinion influence the meeting? I’m not sure I really understood that part. It is true that at the beginning, I relied on Dr. Gatao to articulate an element that was important to you, but did their opinion have a real influence on the meeting? how can we support each other in a formal way? Is having an opinion formal or informal? How can we support each other in a formal way to make strong recommendations? Thank you very much.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
Somebody who is a very dear friend of Vlada and me, an elder in the Diplo Foundation. He’s a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta and one of the brilliant, most brilliant minds you will meet. Two examples that I think that kind of reflect on both of the points that you’ve mentioned. I was in Malta organizing a conference. It was a diplomacy of small state conference that we organized in Malta in 2007 or something like that. And at that time, my country Macedonia was still fighting on recognition, what country recognizes bilateral relations. And we hadn’t established diplomatic relations with Malta yet. So I wasn’t at that time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but I took it upon myself to… Apologies, that was too quickly. To do something about it, to try to do something about it because the foreign minister at that time of Malta was coming in. So I asked our friend Alex, can you help with an introduction so that I can convince him that we should establish diplomatic relations. And he said, well, listen. He’s arriving here at 9.03. We’re starting at 9.15. He should be up at the table like this first to start the meeting. When he arrives, I will take him to the… to get up onto the floor, come with me and I will slow down as he is walking and you can use the time to convince him. And this is exactly how it went. He came in the car, Alex took out the minister and, you know, instead of walking fast and walking slow, he’s giving me the opportunity to convince the minister that we should do this quickly. This is, you know, if you’re into this game, there’s a lot of, you know, most people think that there isn’t creativity in diplomacy. Actually, there’s a lot of room for creativity. Diplomacy is just very subtle. You know, there’s a lot of things that can be done, but it’s very subtle. Most people don’t recognize these small things, right? So I think that you use every moment. If you’re a diplomat and if you want to get it done and if it becomes important to you, you use every moment for achieving what you’re meant to achieve. The other thing is as well about something that comes to me from him, because he’s spoken of the importance of persuasion in diplomacy. You mentioned, well, does that from, that comes from, I mean, in this case from Catholics, it can be from anyone, right? Like, so you use it. Are you persuaded by the logic? This is the key thing. You hear, does this logic persuade? So persuasion is very important in diplomacy that it makes sense, both when you’re presenting something and also when you’re receiving arguments for whatever. They should be persuasive. They should be well thought out. It should be logic and reason that is, that makes sense. So it’s important for diplomats to sharpen that tool of persuasion, to be able to really make arguments that are persuasive and also to be able to see, apologies for the language, but call BS when you see BS, right? It’s understanding when somebody is not just not telling the truth, but you’re not persuasive, right? So I think that these are the two things that come to mind as a kind of response to what you said. But thank you very much. Very good points.

Vladimir Radunovic:
I’ll just quickly reflect before passing the floor on the two concrete examples from the Open-Ended Working Group. You mentioned the formal and informal format. And that is something that is very important in the current Open-Ended Working Group because the positions of states on modalities of involvement of other stakeholders have been a stumbling stone since the beginning. You have a block of countries, particularly led by Russia, China, and partners, which are very conservative in terms of understanding the discussions under the remit of the first committee, peace and security, should continue being very traditional and conservative and close to certain circles. Plus, they obviously understand that the most dominant players of all other stakeholders are actually coming from the West, big tech companies, civil society, because of the culture that exists there. So they are strongly against greater involvement of other stakeholders, even though they tend to recognize that there is an influence. But they’re afraid that this could be an additional impact on various countries. On the other hand, the other block, particularly, OK, let’s say Europe, US, and so on, they are very aware of the importance of the other stakeholders, as you mentioned. But they obviously also play the game. They want to have their own players more vocal. So this is a big stumbling stone. And that’s why the chair of the Open-Ended Working Group is typically very sensitive on the format and very cautious that in the formal processes. you don’t have other stakeholders speaking unless it is a dedicated slot, which is called type of informal multi-stakeholder consultation. And there you have a lot of other countries which are actually listening, which brings me to your second point or the last point that you raised, which is the value that you heard from other stakeholders. To be honest, being in the shoes of those stakeholders which are contributing to the open-ended working group regularly, I always ask myself, is anyone really reading our contributions and listening to us? Because, you know, the states have their own dynamics, someone is giving us the floor, is anyone really listening? But I can tell you in the last iteration in March, we were in Europe, we had side session and there are many side events like the panel discussion we had. And we were sharing, we were invited to share some of our experiences as civil society, private sector. And I think someone raised it like, but I don’t know if actually the government’s using. And I can tell you a couple of governments raised their hand and said, we can assure you that we do. And we read everything that you post and we read everything that you say, not probably not all the governments, but many of them, because we see the benefit of that, as you said. We start understanding things that we didn’t understand. Of course we understand there is a bias sometimes in your positions, obviously, but we are diplomats, we understand how to filter it out, but we learn a lot. I think that’s a great value of the multistakeholder process also in the open. Just from that firsthand experience of the OEWG, but I’m sure Kate will let us know more from her experience later. Please.

Panelists:
Thank you very much for the experience. I prefer to take advantage of the experience of the President. And I would like to rejoice in the great way in which he led the debate. And I would like to tell him that if I were a woman, he would have voted for me. to conquer my heart, because I was literally seduced by his way of conducting the debate. More seriously, I would like, always in this perspective, to benefit from your experience. In the president’s words, whatever we say, neutrality, we can say that it does not exist. Impartiality, yes, but neutrality is complicated. On a test where he plays the role of president, did he manage at some point to reveal his personal position in the negotiation of a test? Otherwise, how does he do it so as not to reflect his position? On the other hand, he must certainly have a position on a test. How does he do to continue without exposing his position? That’s the first point. The second, it’s true, it was a simulation, a beautiful simulation. We reached a consensus. We didn’t expect it, but there can be situations where there is a blockage, a blockage in the negotiation. Did he manage to have this experience of blocking? And if so, how did he behave? What are the rules that he was able to apply to be able to explain the situation? Thank you.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
So the thing that comes to mind to answer that is when I was chairing the group of environmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems. A new topic, perhaps the most dangerous development in the field of weaponry and war and disarmament at the moment, I would say. So just to be clear what that means, lethal autonomous weapons systems or just autonomous weapons systems is any combination of artificial intelligence and weapons. And by that, I mean weapons of any kind. Weapons that can be used on land, on water, underwater, in the air, in cyberspace, in space. It’s just that autonomy, an algorithm making decisions. So a very new topic. I was the second chair of that new body. And we got to a point of having guidance on my chairmanship. Very big development. Now, my personal opinion is, this obviously is a very bad, very dangerous development. But my understanding of the situation is that the biggest military powers are developing these as it is. You can’t stop. Not only that, the middle and small powers are all of a sudden seeing a benefit to level the playing field. So for me, it’s impossible to stop it. The best way is to either regulate it and to try to find a way to create a framework for discussion, further discussion. So there’s a lot of players in it. One of them is a civil society gathering that is called something to kill a robot. So basically a coalition to stop killer robots, a coalition to stop killer robots. They created this video, you may have seen it. So it’s a very impressive video of an arms dealer kind of having this little thing where they develop it and all of a sudden it’s able to shoot. So you have a whole swarm of, anyways. The discussion was happening in Geneva under the convention of circumventional weapons. There is the possibility of that stopping being in Geneva and going to New York in the first committee. My view was that that’s a bad move because in the convention of circumventional weapons, you can have that discussion, first of all, within the framework of international humanitarian law. Secondly, it’s much calmer discussion in Geneva than it is in New York. So I thought that it is important to keep that conversation in Geneva. And because of that, I felt that those kinds of voices like the coalition against killer robots are not constructive specifically for this, that they’re overblowing the whole situation, that actually they’re not focusing on the real threats. And I can go on and on and on. So my point is this, I understood a complex set of issues that cannot be divided into this and that, into right and wrong. It’s very complex. But I also have an idea that within that diplomatic framework, I prefer for that discussion to stay within Geneva and not to be taken to New York to the first committee. So I have never revealed my view of what I think about autonomous weapons. If you ask me personally, I think it’s a very dangerous development. But the diplomat in me would not get into that. The key thing here, among several key things, is to keep the conversation in Geneva. And at the same time, push as much as possible the big powers to make the concessions that they need to do. So the long story short, yes, there’s a lot of filters that I’ve had to put, what I say and how I say it, and it would be very important for me to know exactly what is important and what is not. So that when I do convey something, it is within the realm of that shifting, where do I want this to go, right? So certainly I can say something and use persuasion to sway that in a given direction. But there’s a lot of filters that it has to go through. So I need to understand where I think the best direction for that to go to is. So hopefully it gives you a relatively good answer, and not a simple one. But these are not simple issues.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Basically, complexity of splitting yourself from yourself as a diplomat. Okay, let’s move to Case with her reflections, as she has also been a participant in one of those processes, a group of government experts. So she has a unique perspective to reflect. Kate, I pass the floor to you.

Dr Katherine Getao:
So thank you very much, and good afternoon, fellow delegates. I have to confess, I’m not a diplomat. I never have been. But I have been involved in diplomatic processes. So I’ll start with the question that was asked last, even though it was not asked to me. When we were, I was in the UN group of governmental experts for three sessions. In that group, the chair is appointed from among the delegates on the first day. And the way I saw those chairs handling, because they are both their country delegates and also the chair, was that they would at times say, I am now going to speak as the delegates of Brazil or Kenya or whichever country. And some of them would actually go and sit in a different place at that point and say, now, this is my view. But the minute they came back and became the chair, they would never again. mentioned position again. So they would always flag to us that at this time I’m the chair, I suppose you’d have the black suit and the black tie as Mutual was sharing with us. I noticed also that among the delegations, we had different people. There were people who are very strongly in the role of the representative of their country, but there were also people who are just in the meeting, ready to listen to others, ready to be persuaded and to sometimes change their view. In fact, there was a delegate from one powerful country who actually was removed by his country because he was one of those who was in the meeting. He could be flexible after listening to the rational and logical positions. So I just thought I’d mention that. There was also the issue about the participation of the private sector and whether it has any influence. I was in the 2017 group of governmental experts, which is deemed, we were not able to reach consensus and we’re not able to publish a report, but it was one of the most interesting groups that I attended. And indeed it is from this group that the open-ended working group was proposed. And that idea of course has become a powerful idea and it was about inclusivity. The group of governmental experts was limited to groups that were selected by the secretary general and the largest group we had, the size of the groups over the years ranged from 10 countries up to the maximum was 25 countries. So the idea behind the open-ended working group was. was that any country that wanted to participate should be able to participate and it should not be limited to a group of countries. But there was a second idea that with the expertise needed with ownership, as I mentioned this morning, the private sector, civil society are very important and their views are important. And this is one of the reasons why the open-ended working group has been very open to submissions from these groups which the UNGG formally was not, even though there has always been lobbying from civil society and the private sector. We used to be wined and dined and taken to a lot of dinners which were hosted by the private sector and they would always take time to explain their positions to us because this is a very important issue for them. And as I said this morning, they have a lot of expertise. They have a lot of stake in the issue. So how do you handle that as a delegate, as the different groups invite us? One, as a person from a developing country, you need to be conscious that the private sector you’re talking to is usually the one with resources who is big enough to be in New York and to host an expensive event for delegates. But it should also cause you as somebody who comes from a country where you also have a private sector. And I think it’s one of the things I said in my submission to also talk to your private sector who may never have a chance to go and lobby everybody because they don’t have the resources yet they have something important to say. And obviously as a country, you have a stake in making sure that your private sector is well protected and taken into account as I argued. But as a delegate, so you learn as I think that has already been mentioned, you learn a lot from the private sector because they really have experience and expertise in this area. You begin to understand some concepts which there’s no time to explain them in the diplomatic forum, but. you meet with the private sector, you can really get some things explained and have a better understanding. I think Lucia talked about logical persuasion and it also helps you because when we, at least for me, when I went in as a delegate from a developing country, there were so many things in the document or in the issues which were new to me. I did not know much about those issues and by listening to other groups like civil society, private sector, as well as the other delegates, I was able to see, you know, this issue is really important for my country. So, in a way, sometimes you approach these processes differently from the delegates from developed countries who are really very stuck in their positions and their capital know what they want. Sometimes you go with some level of knowledge, but also some areas which are new to you. So, collect as much information as you can, be persuaded and prioritize. I’ll just quickly say that I agree the chair was very impressive. He knows the rules of procedure. He knew how to engage and respect delegates and I hope you felt that you were being included and your position was important. He also knew how to deal with issues that might threaten the process. There are some countries, either as themselves or as proxies, who are in the process just to make sure that it does not succeed and so you have to know as the chair how you’re going to handle respectfully the issues that they bring which can easily derail the whole negotiation. He knew when to take time out when we need a break. He talked about time, timing and tempo and how to move us from formal to informal modes. In terms of yourselves as the delegates, I observed that you are committed, that you used and did your best to master the document that was before you. You had positions of Although it’s also important to draft your positions, because I remember that I sat next to a difficult gentleman once on a plane and he was telling me that you Africans, the reason why you don’t get anywhere in the world is because you never write anything down. So, let us be challenged that we we have very good positions but they’re not recorded. So let’s record so that they get into the, into the record, the way we want them to get into the record not the way they understood by other people. After listening to us. Then, of course, you participated very well. And you are very collaborative and cooperative, which was interesting because usually there are big fights in this meeting, which area do we do I feel we can grow. I noticed that you are not discussing with other groups, and part of the game is about getting others to agree with you, so that the positions that you are very passionate about getting to the document because of course any other delegates can kill your position and cause it to be left out of the documents. So as well as discussing among yourselves, I would have expected you to try and move on, get others to support your positions. I liked that orange you always were agreeing with others and that’s also very important to support their positions. But at the same time, it also makes others feel like supporting you. So it’s a clever way of also people, people like the fact that you’re supporting them so they also start supporting you so it can be a strategy. What about your national position, you know, for example, there are certain words which I think Vlada is going to bring up like due diligence, which was a big fight, because due diligence costs money. And people don’t want to commit their country to something which maybe they’re going to find it difficult to pay. So, when you hear the wording, you have to be very careful about it because then you have to think now, what does this mean for my country? Can I support this? Will it cause a problem to my national position? So, looking at those words and making sure that they fit your national position and also the national obligations that will come about because of that position is important. And at the same time, even when you are drafting, there are words that irritate other delegations or they won’t take your position at all once they see that word there. So, you need to know what they are and either find another word or find a way of talking to them and persuading them outside the meeting. The last thing I’ll mention is one thing I learned is who is the power broker. Most of the big delegations in particular, they had the main delegates and then they had a support team. And so, you have to be very careful about that. And I think that’s one of the things that’s important to remember. So, I’ll stop there.

Vladimir Radunovic:
various multi-stakeholder forums, if you observe who is referring to whom. So I would face and say, I don’t know. So as my dear colleague, Katrin said, da da da. Now, I also remember what Luke just said, da da da. And you can realize the network of people and how they play with each other and support each other and build a network and so on. By listening carefully, you can get an idea who’s supporting whom and how it works. But I wanted to bring back to a lady here. Another element, you raised it, I think it’s really important, which is the position of developing countries in these negotiations. The big countries come with huge delegations. They come with experts from the capital. They come with teams in cyber, in MFA, cyber people, cyber ambassadors. They’re very sourced, they’re well-prepared. And you typically come alone or even a person from New York. And that’s a typical scenario in an open-ended working group because it’s in New York. And again, this is an important emphasis. When it’s in Geneva, it’s more like cooking. There is more flexibility. When it’s in New York, it’s a higher level one. That’s where decisions are made. It’s where so many decisions are made. The people that come to represent you from your missions in New York, typically play with like five topics at the same time. They don’t have a clue what’s happening there. They’ll probably sit there and listen. Maybe they’ll have one red line. They’ll try to raise a hand or they’ll just listen to what the others say and say, okay, I agree. they lack people, you, generally, in developing countries, especially small-legged people. So one good advice is to do it regionally or sub-regionally. The more you are, the stronger you are. You can also divide the load, as long as you can trust each other. The other tip is, piggyback on you, your citizens, at least from the region, that are involved in the private sector, in civil society, in the technical community, you have highly qualified people, which are not part of the government, but they are very well-known and have an influence. So try to think about and map them and make sure you use them. Partnerships are everything in your case. But with that, I wanted to bring back to you. And if I can kindly ask you to tell the story of the yellow sticky notes, because I think it’s illustrative of what you have to do to manage when you’re alone. Thank you.

Dr Katherine Getao:
So the seven years I was in the UNGG, I was alone. And I would notice that some of the delegations were very big, up to 10 people, six, at least two. And then you are alone. And you see there are legal issues, there are technical issues which are being brought up. It’s difficult even to have the confidence to speak, because you needed somebody to tell you technically what you’re saying is okay, or legally it’s okay, this is a point of international law, because, of course, you don’t know all these things so well. So I’ll just mention two things. One is, of course, the yellow notes, because for the other delegates, the ones who have big support teams behind them, in those days it was a little bit before all these WhatsApp and electronics. So those people have those yellow notes. sticky notes. So as the delegate is talking, somebody from behind would pass them a yellow note, of course, to give them some information or some help on what they’re doing. So I always used to make a joke that I don’t have anybody to pass me the yellow notes, which are really giving you a cue or a help. So what did I do instead? I sometimes used the experts of other delegations. So I would go and ask, I would ask Japan, Germany, even Cuba, or whatever, that please, my fellow delegate, may I use your legal expert? I never used just one. I would try to choose two or three so that I can compare and contrast the advice. Usually, I would have drafted something, and I will be asking them to comment on it in terms of its accuracy and its conformance with the requirements. Yeah, so you can be innovative and do things like that, even when you’re disadvantaged. Of course, in these days of electronic with Zoom and all that, what Flader is saying is that now you can actually even be in touch with people from your country, even if they don’t have the money to come to New York or Geneva. You can tell them that during these five days, can you please avail yourself so that we can be having a little Zoom meeting, I can WhatsApp you a text, and you can comment. So I think you’re more equipped than I was in those days. And I think that even the AI, which we’ve been showing you, there are many tools and methodologies that you can use now to give yourself the technical backstopping if you’re alone or in a very small delegation, and you need a lot of technical support outside the meeting because of the complexity. So those are just some sharing my experience and also giving suggestions of things you can do to buttress your contribution.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Thanks, Kay. Let me get back to you exactly, Babatunde and anyone else who wants to jump in with your experience and reflections, please. Babatunde, and then we’ll get to the call.

Panelists:
Thank you very much, the chair and the panelists. Just a bit of my own personal reflection. Let me commend the chair for chairing very well in the course of the exercise. Two things have actually brought to my own mind. I’ve been privileged to be on the two sides of the negotiation. One, representing one of the five nuclear weapon states, I will not mention the country. And then the second one being part of the developing country. And as you said, I know the difference between the two. One of the key difference is that negotiation does not start where it started. Negotiation starts from even the agenda setting. In other words, as developing countries, we need to be able to know how we influence the agenda. Then the rule of the procedure, the venue of the meeting, the format of the meeting. These are key things that most of the developed countries have already given far ahead of us to before whether it is going to be in Geneva, or it’s going to be in New York or it’s going to be somewhere else. The second thing is the issue of time and timing. When you are making care your positions. You need to be mindful of the time. There are two kinds of time. One is the time you are allotted for you to put forward your national positions. And I’ve been in a meeting whereby five minutes is allotted, and you find out that most of countries, developing countries, have not even reached half of their e-positions before the timing in five minutes ended. So the clarity of what you want to put forward is very, very essential. The third element of the timing is, I don’t know many of you followed the proceedings at COP28 in Dubai, and I was there. At the last minute, the oil producing countries, you know, made a very significant contribution to ensure that, you know, their position is highly reflected in the final communique. So when you are developing your national positions, you need to think through scenarios, strategies, countries that are likely to be of significant interest, or likely to kind of adopt more or less within the similar range. And where possible is the issue of informal consultation during the launch time. I remember I was in negotiations in Geneva. It was a very technical accounting stand report issues. And, you know, I represent the foreign office. I have somebody from the accounting background, you know, giving me briefing papers. And then during the launch time, I got a call from the cabinet. It said, I’m giving you instructions to speak to delegates from country one, two, three, four, during this launch time, within the next 15 minutes, and have a nice position. So the five of us gathered together. and we’ve consulted. Now, the reason why I share the example is that sometimes we need to read the table. Look at countries that have a similar position as yours and build your alliances together. And where necessary, of course, where your co-hosts can harmonize positions before, you know, the negotiations, we are always there. And that is what I like to do to ensure that at least we have the original positions and where necessary continental position. I just say I should share those thoughts with you. The meeting did not start when the meeting starts. The meetings have already started before you even start doing the cooking. Thank you. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. I would like to thank the president for the way he conducted the debates, the activities. I think we have all learned a lot from this way of presiding. I would also like to thank the experts for their contributions, their guidance. Sometimes, by looking at the table of civil society, it can give you an idea of the physical reaction, the reaction, the expression of the face when we express ourselves. It can sometimes give you an idea of the depth of your reflection or the sensitivity of your reflection. That’s the impression I have. Personally, when I saw the composition of the teams, the first thing that came to my mind was that I said to myself, well, there are four French-speaking teams and three English-speaking teams. That’s the first thing that came to my mind. The second thing I said to myself was that Yellow is a fighter. That’s the idea I had, that Yellow will never be able to do it. Yellow is a fighter. So, it was better for us not to make an opponent. So, in our communication, we tried to give a key to the French-speaking teams, while also including two English-speaking teams, not to leave the impression that there is a French-speaking collaboration against an English-speaking collaboration. I don’t know, I wanted to ask this question at this level. Is this strategy desirable in negotiations? That’s the first question. The second question, it can be crazy, but in the case of, for example, negotiations, as is currently happening here, the negotiations of the CDAO are underway. And obviously, we don’t have a right to look at the menu. Is the host country to use a little food to pass its interests? Because we know that there are foods that favour agronomy. It’s very important. Is the host country to use this kind of strategy? It should give a meal that favours agronomy, knowing that its delegates will obviously not go. So, it’s a bit to say that, is Roubladize really a risk that can be paid in international negotiations? Thank you very much.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
Let me try to answer the first one. Is it a good strategy to work with like-minded? I would say whatever works is a good strategy, in a sense. But at the same time, one should be careful not to go into what is comfortable. I think that if it helps, certainly. But don’t rely just on that. Because ultimately, you have different interests and goals than just to be with like-minded. You have sovereign goals which you need to fulfil. And they need to be fulfilled because you’re talking like-minded. In this case, front-line countries. But perhaps not. These are instruments. You change them based on need. And you should be aware always, I think, where your comfort zone is. And sometimes be able to… get out of that conflict zone. And I think that this is a good connected issue to the food aspect. I wouldn’t go as far as to say something would make you sleepy, so use them in a negotiation. I think you should be aware of those kinds of things and not be afraid to them, so that you’re not in a situation where it affects you. But food is a very important part of diplomacy, very important. After the Napoleonic Wars, it could have been that France was put on the side and all decisions were made. Now, the winning powers over Napoleon got together, and it is to the benefit of the French, and at that time the French representative, who was actually an advisor to Napoleon, was an advisor to the king before Napoleon, and was the main negotiator after Napoleon lost. And he went to Vienna to the negotiations, and he brought in the best chef in Paris, the best. And he was organizing parties that everybody wanted to be at, because all of a sudden they were exposed to food that they had never been to. So France would have been a losing power. And in a way, it was a chef who made it possible, well, the brilliant Palais-Rhin, who made it possible for them to be a part of that conversation that was going on, to redo the map of Europe. So I think that food is a very important part. Not necessarily do you serve food that makes you sleepy, I think you should… should be aware of those kinds of things. But yeah, it is a very important part of diplomacy and it can be used to great effect and you can be used if you’re not careful.

Vladimir Radunovic:
You know, that’s in a way that’s comforting because that means that the artificial intelligence is not gonna be able to replace diplomats, you know. So that’s not bad at all. Okay, what I suggest, we have a comment there and then if anyone else wants, then would I suggest we close this, wrap up this discussion. We make a short break for a coffee, we come back and then we’ll go into topics and then wrap up. We have two comments there, colleague there, colleague there, and then we’ll wrap up, yeah, please. Yes.

Panelists:
Thank you. I just wanted to share an experience regarding the costs as you said, Mr. Bernier. I am from the direct direction of the African integration and consequently, we are in charge of the popularization of priority programs, the organizations of non-American and non-Romanian. So, during the Civilization Crisis, it was on the area of continental free science and the path of popularization of the CBO. So, we went to a small town in Guinea, we regrouped all the parties present and we started doing the popularization in France. We talked for two hours, we were almost at the end, and a woman called me, she said, my son is in Guinea, why are we doing this? I said, everything you are saying, we don’t understand anything. Well, what she said to me, Je me suis dit qu’on est venu pour vulgariser, mais on ne s’y fait pas comprendre. Donc j’ai compris et j’ai continué. À dix minutes de la fin, j’ai sorti, il y avait quelques bières dans ma poche, j’ai fait sortir les bières là. J’ai dit bon, tout ce qu’on vient de dire là, qui peut me résumer ça en trois minutes dans la langue de cette ville? Il y avait un journaliste qui parlait la langue locale, qui fait son travail dans la langue locale, qui nous servait. Il a résumé en trois minutes. Et quand il a fini de résumer en trois minutes, après on a fait la fin du film. En sortant, c’est une autre femme qui a dit, dans tout ce qu’ils ont dit là, c’est ce que le journaliste là a dit que moi j’ai compris. Sinon je n’avais rien compris. Donc, et parmi les organisateurs, il y avait un monsieur aussi, je crois, il y avait un cadre du plan, qui fait aussi sur le journal 2063. Donc, depuis là, j’ai compris que se faire comprendre est très important, mais aussi il faut écouter. Il faut écouter les parties présentes et chaque fois que vous les écoutez, ça vous donne une idée. Et depuis là, chaque fois que je perds la situation, je demande, je dis bon, si je n’ai pas d’argent, je dis bon, je présente quelque chose. Je dis bon, celui qui traduit ça en trois minutes, ça a toujours marché. Mais ce monsieur aussi m’a dit qu’il a fait la vulgarisation du journal 2063, il n’avait pas d’argent. Mais quand il a fini, la poisson qu’il avait acheté, il restait dix canettes. Et à la fin, il a dit, bon, celui qui peut résumer ça en trois minutes, il lui donne les dix-quatre canettes. Et il dit que ça a marché. Et chaque fois qu’on se voit, il dit, ah, pour Neslida, je l’ai appliqué, ça a toujours marché. Donc pour vous dire qu’il faut toujours écouter les patins d’enfants et de bébés pour Monsieur Platini. Merci beaucoup.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
Thank you. Particularly with the gifts, it’s a crucial moment. I think this boils down to what also Victor mentioned, the psychology is important still, and the personality in this negotiation. Okay.

Panelists:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. And let me thank our former chair for the very scholarly way he conducted this session, the scholarship he showed, and the experience. That’s great. Now, having said that, we’ve been in this business for a few years, just a few years. I have asked my people to say, it’s not how long, but how well. You know, it’s not how long you are, but how well you apply yourself in this business. And therefore, that application is what guides some of us in the conduct of our business. Our national position is important. Whatever adjustment we need to do and consideration we need to do, the national position stands. And if you want to bend, you must bend because you’re not getting somewhere. That means what we are saying is that every word in negotiation is serious and important. You know, and that could be why people were thinking we are very aggressive, we are not aggressive. We are not aggressive. We are only looking at logical consideration, logical reasoning in why we think we could join you. And if we submit that your presentation, if you consult us and we see that your presentation is logical, not only logical, but cost-effective and sustainable, we join because it ties us with our national interests. And this is just the experience we wish to share with colleagues here. These few points I just raised, it will guide you, national interests, reasonability and sustainability of the proposition that is being made on table and how it works with your national interests. Taking note that every word is important and every word is serious. Why I say this, we had an experience, we went to the peace and security meeting in Algeria and I was part of the expert committee. In the Peace and Security Council of Africa, we have the expert committee, the young, young officers. We look at documents before the big boys who look at the principles, who finally look at it. And I had a situation with South Africa, let me to call the name, South Africa. The expert committee, my colleague, my country went for that Algeria process, we call it the Algeria process. And then because South Africa did not go, when the reports came for us to learn, South Africa said they were not going to adopt it, that it was going to take notes of the reports. And I said, no, we cannot adopt, take note of the reports because you are not there and the substance of the report is so weighty that you have to adopt it for making it a working document. That became a situation. I said, no, we cannot be. So you can see the word adoption and noting the seriousness in it. So, fellow delegates, we’re into serious business, and so we take things seriously. When it comes to friendship, which is not to be discussed on table, we can be flexible. However, the dog says, if I fall down for you and you fall down for me, it’s a play. Thank you very much, sir.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Thank you. Well, obviously, you also have a lot of experience with the different type of diplomacy negotiations. I think that’s special. So it’s about sharing the knowledge. I suggest we close this discussion. Let’s pass the final one to you. And then we go for coffee and we come back and we’ll basically go through the document and your positions to briefly discuss the main substantial issues and maybe do a quick, quick reality check of what would really happen if you had this document and these issues in the open and you’re working with today.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
Thank you very much. I’ll finish on something that I discovered is very important in my chairing. I found out how important it is to distinguish national positions from national interests. And as chair, I think that part of my success was that I always tried to, first of all, understand the interests even better than sometimes delegations that were coming to me understood the girl. But I thought that is important. If I am to convince them to do something, I need to go beyond positions. And because sometimes positions are drafted, they’re negotiated at home. Sometimes it’s just some bureaucrat in a ministry who draws that together because they think that that’s what it is. Sometimes it’s a very well-developed positions nationally with a lot of different ministries participating. But even not just from the perspective of the chair, but from the perspective of a delegate, really understand what are the core interests, not just sovereignty, this is my right to say this and that. What are my interests here? Do I have interest in capacity building? Let’s focus on that. What kind of interests are there? What do I need help with, right? Is the confidence building measures, is this problematic for us because of this and that? It’s hard to get to draw, to fill whatever those confidence building measures are. Really understand your interests. If it is international law or like a new norm, what is the background of how you approach that issue? And how does it best reflect, not those positions necessarily that are drawn in that, that’s very important, but what are the interests in the background? That allows both as a delegate and if you are in a position of chair to chair, to really focus on the important stuff and to try to find consensus based on the interests. Because positions can be, you can sometimes go around, but you shouldn’t be able to go around interests. It’s the most realistic part in it. So with that, let me thank you very much for the opportunity to really be here. It was really a pleasure. It’s a pleasure to be, I mean, here in Accra, in Ghana, it’s my first time. A pleasure to work with you, with wonderful really people. And I really look forward to some future opportunities. with these to see each other. So for that, thank you very much. And from my side, thank you. Good. Let’s make a 15 minutes break and we come back for the last part. If please, delegation yellow wants to say something.

Team Yellow:
I hope we are seeing in country mood or we are now in private capacities. Capacities, exactly. So being in private capacity and having tested the likes and the dislikes of the delegation and having consulted very widely before we now disintegrated from country mood to private mood, what we got under the popular opinion is to solicit very kindly for understanding. That the program is just interesting and continually showing to be interesting that one has to be here till evening night. We will not be tired. We’re very happy. However, the extraordinary, very extraordinary reception we have received so far in Ghana, we need to punctuate it by having a little time to move around to see how this is good. Apart from the guided one, that guided one was too restrictive. Your excellencies, it’s too restrictive. And therefore we want to greatly indulgence, your excellencies, that this program be expedited. The speech should increase a little to see if we can get the time for ourselves. Not that we don’t like the program, we can be here for the 10, 100 more hours. But to gain time for ourself, for a little bit of refreshment. socialization. And I think by that conclusion, I strongly submit this plea to you. Please, your excellencies. Thank you very much.

Ljupco Gjorgjinski:
Thank you, Fibonacci. I’ll now put the chair’s hat and say, firstly, the agenda has been adopted at the beginning of the meeting. And then the second one is, I’m just a chair, there is a secretary general over there. No, I’m kidding. What I can suggest, there is a benefit to quickly run through the substance, but it doesn’t have to take long. So what we can alternatively do is have another 20 minutes or so to run through the topics, and then do the wrap up of what’s next, maybe some reflections from you and call it a day, and whoever wants to save the coffee, whatever. But I certainly have to listen to boss. So whatever the boss says.

Boss:
Thank you very much, chair. And thank you very much, Jacob. I hear you. But unfortunately, we are here to run a program. I have my mandate, you have your mandate. My mandate as the chair of the ECOWAS Commission is to try and build capacity for the region. Unfortunately, if it could be done, we’ve actually shortened the program. So initially, this program was supposed to be between three to four days. But because member states didn’t react as quickly as they should have done, we’ve had to shorten it down. So, yes, you can have some leisure time. But that decision is a personal decision you have to take. If you want some leisure time, you can opt not to come to some of the sessions and do that at your own peril, or you can join. Again, when we issue our tickets, our hands are also tied logistically because a lot of member states do not respond to our requests on time. So if we get early requests, and you say you want to stay an additional day before the meeting or after the meeting, we can make allowances obviously at your own expense. I will please plead with you to understand where we are coming from as well. So, sorry.

Panelists:
the lawyer of someone who wants to, but it doesn’t seem to me that he asked for an extra day, in my humble opinion. I think that’s what this session is about. We finish it much earlier so that we have a little time to circulate. It was not a question of asking for an extra day. At least that’s what I would like to understand.

Boss:
If you’re asking for an extra day to finish off today. That’s different. If you’re asking for the program to be shot and so you have some leisure time. Again, that’s different. So I will assume that what Bode is saying is what you want, you want to finish early today.

Panelists:
Am I right. Okay. So I don’t know what to say. I don’t want to be misled. But what I mean is that we have the pleasure of being here for the next 100 hours. But if the program, from popular opinion, we can shorten that hours, then to maybe two seconds, then we can. But if it is not comfortable, we are not so strong in it. Thank you.

Boss:
Okay. So, you can take a comfort break for five minutes, stretch your legs, we will all come back, try and wrap up and that’s actually the most important piece of the workshop, because it’s for you to tell us how best we can now support you as Diplo, as GIZ, as the FFO and as the ECOWAS commission. But if you feel we can just skip that bit, that’s also fine. So, it really, for us at the commission, we just facilitate the process we listen to the member states, so we can have a really short break just a short break, stretch your legs, we’ll come back, finish, and then you can have the rest of the day provided the bus is here. here because the boss is also on a strict time, so you may well have the time and you’d have to go around KIPTC, which kind of hits the purpose of the bus is not here. So what do we want to do? Short coffee break, stretch your legs, come back and then, or do you want a longer coffee break? You decide. We’re all grown, so. All right, so I’m going to hand it back to Vlado. What time should we be back here, please?

Vladimir Radunovic:
Well, let’s say seven minutes. That’s a compromise, seven minutes so that people can have time to go to the toilet and the coffee. Seven minutes, you come back, we’ll briefly run through the, let’s say, the findings of the document and then wrap up with the feedbacks and the next steps, like I said. Thank you.